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This thesis seeks to reassess the rise of the city of Beirut and its place as a central 
city in the Levant.  From 1834-1939, Beirut built a number of infrastructure 
improvements which reoriented trade through Beirut and made it a central gateway of 
between Europe and the Middle East.  In the Ottoman Era, local merchants allied with 
French concessionary companies to build a roadway, a rail line and a port which brought 
increased prosperity and trade to the city.  The merchants had to petition the Ottoman 
state to secure these improvements, and the business elite continued using and developing 
these tactics of negotiation under the French Mandatory government.  By negotiating and 
allying with the French state, Beirut instigated the development of a modern port and an 
air terminal in Beirut, securing her commercial centrality in the Middle East.  The 
development of this infrastructure was powered by moments of economic competition 
from regional cities like Sidon, and most notably, Haifa.  Beirutis saw any transportation 
development in a Levantine city not their own as a direct threat to the prosperity and 
commerce of Beirut.  To counter these threats, Beiruti merchants and press organized to 
build competing structures as seen in the construction of the 1938 port.  Through a 
 vi 
combination of local agency, French capital, and alliances and negotiations with the state, 
Beruitis successfully developed the infrastructure which redirected the trade routes 
through Beirut, making it an indispensable gateway to the Levant. 
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On Tuesday, 31 October 1933, the port of Haifa completed an extensive 
expansion of their port facilities under the auspices of the British Mandate of Palestine.1  
During the opening ceremony the British government unveiled a new harbor that 
impressed dignitaries, merchants and investors alike with its modern facilities and 
capacity to handle large ocean liners.  Arab, Jewish and British officials and 
businessmen, foreign dignitaries, and four representatives from the French High 
Commissioner’s office in Beirut were present at the grand opening ceremonies.2  The 
occasion was a triumph for the British High Commissioner, demonstrating the 
technological superiority and massive capacity of their modern port. Throughout the 
speeches that day, the French dignitaries sat, dejected, aware that they would soon have 
to report back to Beirut and confirm that Haifa’s new harbor outstripped Beirut’s old port 
in every way.   
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the port of Beirut had been growing into the 
central port of the Levant.3  Today, Beirut is the capital of the modern state of Lebanon 
and the port is the largest in Lebanon.  But the rise of Beirut’s port had never been 
assured or inevitable; from 1832 on, ensuring the city’s development was a consistent site 
of struggle between business interests in the growing city and the state.  This thesis seeks 
to reassess the rise of the city of Beirut, and its centrality in the Levant.  The rise was not 
                                                 
1 Official Program for the Ceremony of the Opening of Haifa Harbour, 31 October 1933, Mandate Syrie-
Liban, Box 708, 1er versement, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Nantes, France [hereafter 
MAE-Nantes]. 
2 M. Grapin, Consul de France a Caiffa à Les Minister des Affaires Etrangeres, 30 November 1933, 
Mandate Syrie-Liban, Box 708, 1er versement, MAE-Nantes. 
3 The “Levant” refers to the area called “Bilad al-Sham” in Arabic: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. 
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produced through Beiruti culture, or through the city’s internal commercial growth; 
Beirut became the central gateway to the Levant by successfully creating and hooking 
into networks of transportation in the Middle East, and positioning itself as a central hub 
for commerce and trade.  In order to become the commercial capital of the Levant, Beirut 
needed to develop the infrastructure for commerce and trade that would give it the 
capacity to participate in European and Middle Eastern trade routes that extended from 
the factories of Manchester to the cities of Persia, becoming a hinge between the east and 
the west.  Lebanese merchants allied with French investors to carve the edifices of 
transportation – a port, a railway, and an air terminal – into the fabric of the city, causing 
sudden economic growth due to the influx of French capital and development.  Their 
achievements thrust Beirut into a central position in the web of transportation and trade 
systems which stretched across the Middle East at the turn of the twentieth century. 
  The rise of Beirut’s port would have been a surprise to anyone living in Beirut in 
the 1800s.  The city has always been noted for its natural beauty, as it sits on the northern 
end of a chain of hills that slope down into St. George’s Bay.4  Approaching Beirut by 
boat, the city seemed to rise out of the water and stretch back over the hills of Ras-Beirut, 
framed with the backdrop of Mount Lebanon.  The east-west projection of Ras-Beirut 
                                                 
4 Geography from: Leila Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard, 1983), 8.  The main bay in Beirut has historically been named “St. George’s Bay,” 
referring to the saint who hailed from Roman Palestine and according the legend slew the dragon around 
300 AD.  The cult of St. George has been popular in Beirut for centuries, and local legend holds that he 
killed the dragon in the bay of Beirut.  Modern Arabic speakers simply call the bay “Khaleej San Georges” 
or “Gulf of Saint George,” but there is some small evidence that the bay used to be called “Jun el-Khidr” or 
“Bay of el-Khidr.” El-Khidr refers to The Green Man that Moses meets in the Quran, who is popularly 
associated with St. George for unknown reasons.  Evidence for usage of “Jun el-Khidr” from: 
Mediterranean Pilot Volume IV: From Cape Matapan (Greece) Eastward, the Mediterranean Archipelago, 
and the Southern Shore of the Mediterranean Sea, Eastward of Ras Ashdie (Libia) (Washington, D.C: U.S. 
Hydrographic Office, 1918), 591. 
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gave St. George’s Bay some protection from the southwest winds which could trouble 
ships.  However, that was where the natural geographic advantages of Beirut ended.  
Although the hills afforded some protection from the southwest winds, St George’s Bay 
was by no means a natural harbor, and during winter vicious weather could whip in from 
the Mediterranean.  Additionally, the bay was extremely shallow, and before a port was 
constructed in 1834, the single grimy quay reaching out into the bay did not extend far 
enough for rowboats from anchored ships to reach it.  The boats would hit bottom, and 
passengers or goods would have to be carried ashore by boatmen.5  Furthermore, the 
mountains were picturesque from the water, but they made transporting goods into the 
interior difficult.  The natural barrier between Beirut and interior cities of the Levant had 
to be negotiated by pack animal on a steep and twisty road.  These geographic drawbacks 
seemed like an inauspicious start for developing a large international port.   
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, there was an active yet small 
coastal trade that passed through Beirut.  Merchant sailing vessels hopped along the 
coastal cities of Anatolia and the Levant, and transported Mount Lebanon’s wood from 
Beirut to Jaffa, and silk from Beirut to Sidon or Acre, where it could be shipped off to 
Marseille.6  Beirut was just another port of call like Tyre, Latakia or Yaffa, and it was 
only in the 1850s that structural improvements to the port and the advent of steam 
resulted in a sudden growth in commerce through Beirut.  Over the next fifty years, 
Beirut would witness massive growth in its economy, as the short routes along the coast 
                                                 
5 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, 9. 
6 Thomas Philipp and Birgit Sch bler,                                                               
        -                                       (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1998), 7. 
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transformed into a web of transportation connections that brought Beirut to the center of 
trade between the Middle East and Europe.   
Beirut entered into these trade routes through the construction of infrastructure 
which made the city indispensable in the Levantine trade routes.  The first was the 
construction of a lazaretto during Egyptian rule of Greater Syria, which made Beirut a 
necessary quarantine stop for Mediterranean shipping lines to the Levant.  Following this, 
French investors established concessionary companies which secured contracts from the 
Ottoman Sultan.  Using these transportation concessionary companies, a single man, 
Count Edmund de Perthuis secured concessions for a roadway and a railway to Damascus 
and for a port in Beirut that was completed just before the turn of the century.  The elites 
and businessmen of Beirut knew the importance of infrastructure projects to improve 
Beirut’s place in Levantine trade.  The local elites were actively involved in securing the 
concessions, by allying with the French companies, raising local money, negotiating with 
the Sultan, and providing a local front man to secure the concession.  Edifices such as the 
port were both products and sites of alliance and contestation between the local 
merchants and the ruling government.  The native elites used what leverage they had to 
encourage the development and centralization of their city, which was accomplished 
through European capitalist investment. 
With the new port, by 1900, Beirut’s port dealt with more shipping than any other 
port on the Middle Eastern coast, surpassed only by Alexandria and Istanbul.7  Silk, 
cotton and wood from the Lebanese Mountains and wheat, barley, and corn from 
                                                 
7 Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: Methuen, 1981), 98. 
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Hawran8 poured into Beirut.9  The goods were initially transported by pack animal, later 
automobile, then and in 1895 the Beirut-Damascus railway was inaugurated, with a spur 
reaching down the grain fields of Hawran.10 These goods came into the port where they 
were loaded onto wooden paddle, and later iron hulled steamships, ready to be shipped 
throughout the Mediterranean – to Marseilles, Liverpool, Antwerp, Algiers and other 
cities.  Finished manufactured products like cottons, tin and metals, (often from 
Manchester factories) were shipped into Beirut’s port from Europe, and Beirut’s rail line 
to Damascus allowed the European wares to spread through Greater Syria.  In less than a 
century, the shallow bay seemed to have made itself indispensable in the system of 
Mediterranean trade, easily surpassing all other coastal cities. 
This economic supremacy was solidified when Beirut constructed a new modern 
port in 1938.  But instead of being the product of natural city growth, the modern port 
was constructed during a moment of economic crisis in the 1930s.  This was a period of 
worldwide depression and massive economic downturn, both for the city of Beirut and 
for the mandatory French government.  With the deflation of the French franc, and the 
crash of Lebanese exports, the 1930s should have been a time of economic austerity.  
Instead, the French mandatory government decided to invest in a 49 million franc port.  
                                                 
8 Hawran, also spelled Hauran or Houran (Arabic for “cave land” referring to the natural caves in this 
volcanic plateau) area about 70 km south of Damascus and due west of Haifa, lying today in modern day 
southwestern Syria and northwestern Jordan.  This area was one of the most fertile and grain rich plains in 
the Levant, and was an important resource for the port city trade. 
9 G. Bie Ravndal (American Consul), “Railways in Syria,” 28 December 1903, in Department of 
Commerce and Labor, Monthly Consular Reports, Vol. LXXV, Nos. 283,284 and 285, April, May, and June 
1904 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 238-241.  
10 Ibid. 
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To discover the reasons for the decision to build an expensive port during a time of 
commercial decline, we must look south to the city of Haifa. 
Through the nineteenth century, a number of the infrastructure improvements 
were constructed in response to economic competition from another city.  To locals, the 
city was involved in a regional war of economic and cultural competition.  The potential 
rise of any other city was a cause for economic anxiety that prompted sudden action on 
the part of the elites.  As a result, the economic growth of Beirut often would see sudden 
expansion imposed by French capital in response to a threat from a competing city. 
In 1933, the construction of the new port in Haifa threatened Beirut’s place as a 
central node in the Levantine trade.  In the late nineteenth century, Haifa experienced 
significant population growth, although it remained a small town.  However, at the turn 
of the century, the Ottoman government focused on building up infrastructure links to the 
town of Haifa in order to counter the increasing European and Lebanese control of 
commerce through Beirut, which threatened Ottoman commercial and strategic interests.  
To this end, the Hejaz Railway authority connected Haifa to Dera’a in 1905, bringing 
Haifa into a railway route that eventually ran from Damascus to Medina.11  Following 
this, under the British Mandatory government in the 1920s and 1930s, Haifa was a city 
growing swiftly in population and industry, linked by rail to interior cities and south to 
Alexandria.  Haifa could access the same barley-rich fields of Hawran but did not have to 
deal with the barrier of Mount Lebanon, and the natural harbor of Haifa easily held a 
large number of ships.  When the new port opened, Haifa positioned itself to take over 
                                                 
11 May Seikaly, Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society 1918-1939 (London: I.B. Tauris., 2002), 23-24. 
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the trade routes that Beirut had previously controlled.  The rise of Haifa in the south 
appeared to be a very real threat to Beirut’s maritime and trade supremacy in the 
economically unstable years of the 1930s. 
When Haifa opened the doors to its new harbor in 1933, this set off a panic in 
Beirut.  Merchants, politicians and the press saw the rise of new port in the south as 
threatening the commercial centrality of Beirut in the Levant.  For the Beirutis, this threat 
was far more serious than the effects of the worldwide depression, which they viewed as 
an economic problem but not a catastrophe.  The development of the port in Haifa, was 
conceived as a much larger problem because it was understood as a threat to the very 
existence of Beirut.  The Beiruti merchants correctly identified Beirut’s economic 
stability as hinging on these trans-Mediterranean transportation routes which it controlled 
through the mechanism of the port.  By building a larger modern port, Haifa had 
developed competing infrastructure to Beirut which could reorder the flow of commerce 
in the Mediterranean.  The economic threat of the Haifan port was not merely to the 
volume of commerce, but to the trade lines which sustained that commerce, and therefore 
had the potential for far-reaching implications.  This port in the south could permanently 
unseat the city of Beirut as the central gateway to the Levant, and as the economic capital 
on the coast. 
In order to confront this existential threat, Beiruti merchants harnessed the 
productive power of the French mandatory state.  Local merchants pushed the French 
government into action, updating their tactics of negotiation that they had developed to 
petition the Ottoman state in order to secure the rights to concessionary companies.  The 
 8 
Beiruti press, merchants and politicians mobilized to petition the French High 
Commissioner of Syria and Lebanon to address this issue.  “Will [the High 
Commissioner] continue to be unaware of stratagems practiced by Palestine to 
economically kill the countries under French Mandate?” asked one newspaper.12  Another 
editorial declared that the High Commissioner must move quickly “to remedy this pitiful 
situation.”13  
Merchants and the press did not agitate for Lebanese nationalist control of the 
economy, but instead used the framework of the French Mandate’s charter to promote 
economic growth in their possessions to compel the state to action. The Beiruti press 
framed the situation as the High Commissioner’s duty to address the economic threat to 
the south, and framed the city competition as competition between the English and 
French empire which threatened French commerce in the Levant.  By doing this, the 
Beiruti press gave the French the possibility of fulfilling obligations to the mandates and 
triumphing over Britain in colonial economic competition.   The press’ endless 
campaigning, combined with pressure from Beirut’s merchants and politicians, was 
ultimately successful, and the High Commissioner reversed France’s policy of economic 
non-involvement, and drew up plans to expand the port of Beirut in 1934.  Beirut’s new 
port was conceived as a massive and impressive monument to modernity, tripling the size 
of the waterfront and able to dock even the largest of ocean liners, like the 12,263 ton Le 
                                                 
12 Lissan, 23 October 1933. 
13 Bassir, 18 November 1933. 
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Champollion.14  With a price tag of about FF 49 million, the new port of Beirut opened in 
1938 to great acclaim and secured Beirut’s position as the premier gateway to the 
Levant.15  Only the next year, Beirut would open the doors to a new aerodrome that 
allowed the city to become an aviation as well as shipping hub, sealing its position of 
transportation supremacy on the coast and effectively removing Haifa from direct 
competition with Beirut. 
 
Figure 1: Port development from 1894-193416 
 
The Beirut-Haifa competition has largely been forgotten in existing literature on 
the Middle East, and on Anglo-French imperial competition.17  After the establishment of 
                                                 
14 Le Champollion was a Messageries Maritimes steamship that ran the Marseille-Beirut-Alexandria routes 
in the 1930s and 1940s.  Arnold Kludas and Charles Hodges, Great Passenger Ships of the World: Vol. 3 
(Cambridge: Stephens, 1976), 8. 
15 Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon, 33. 
16 Jean Laugenie, "Le Port de Beyrouth," Revue De Géographie De Lyon. 31 (4): 271-294, 1956. 
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the state of Israel in 1948, all surrounding Arab countries declared an embargo on goods 
from Israel.  This embargo cut off any chance that Haifa’s shipping could continue to 
compete with Beirut; Haifa could no longer transport goods by rail or auto to any 
surrounding country, resulting in Beirut’s economic regional supremacy in the mid-
twentieth century.18  Additionally, Lebanese nationalist history has perpetuated a 
narrative of the eternal existence of Beirut’s port, going back to the time of the 
Phoenicians.19  Beirut is constructed as always having been a central city in the Levant, 
and always having been a significant port.  These two factors have caused historians to 
project backwards the importance of the port of Beirut and the insignificance of Haifa. 
But, the moment of Haifa’s challenge and Beirut’s subsequent ascendancy was a 
turning point for the city’s centrality, and came after years of inter-city competition and 
trade development.  The history of Beirut’s infrastructure development and city 
competition with Haifa is important, not simply because the story has not been told 
before, or because it was the moment which assured Beirut’s centrality as the primary 
gateway to the Levant.  But also, this moment reveals the local understanding of their city 
as a central node in the web of transportation that stretched across the Middle East.  It 
furthermore exposes the Beirutis’ ability to work within the framework of the Ottoman 
and colonial state to compel the development of infrastructure and edifices of modernity 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 There are brief mentions of the Beirut-Haifa competition in some books: Histoire De Beyrouth 
(Paris:2004), 272-78, and Marwan R. Buheiry, “Beirut’s Role in the Political Economy of the French 
Mandate, 1919-30” in The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World (Darwin Press: Princeton, 
1989), 549-52, Meir Zamir, Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926-1939 (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1997), 86-87. 
18 Frank Brenchley, Britain and the Middle East: An Economic History, 1945-87 (London: L. Crook 
Academic Pub, 1989), 37. 
19 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 5. 
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that were essential to Beirut’s continued economic centrality.  Through this 
understanding, alliance with French investors and negotiation with the state, Beirutis 
were able to reorient the lines of trade in the Levant and make their city an indispensable 
gateway between the east and the west.  The construction of the railway, port and then the 
airport definitively shifted the balance of economic power in the Middle East to Beirut, 




Chapter 1: The Rise of Beirut (1832-1918) 
There is a subtle yet persistent misunderstanding that Beirut has always been an 
important and famous port in the Levant.  No respected historian of Lebanon would 
perpetuate this idea today, but it nonetheless constantly appears in Lebanese political 
narratives, literature and national culture.  Part of the reason for this historical 
misunderstanding is the mythic construction of a historical continuity between the ports 
of Phoenicia and the port of Beirut today.  “Phoenicians” refers to a group of Canaanite 
Indo-European tribes who lived on the coast of Greater Syria and were well known for 
their sea-faring abilities.  Phoenicia was a bridge between the east and west which 
became a center for cultural diffusion and trade, and gave the world naval engineering 
and the alphabet.  The Arab occupation of the Levant resulted in the decline of Phoenicia 
and her trade empire.  In order to preserve their unique ethnic heritage and culture, the 
Phoenicians retreated to Mount Lebanon where the bastion of the Mountain preserved 
and inculcated the exceptional abilities of the Lebanese to be traders, scholars and create 
crossroads between the east and west.20  At least that is the story.  Today’s academics, 
such as Asher Kaufman, have applied stringent scholarship to dismantling these 
narratives, as he has found that the myth of Phoenicia continues to permeate Lebanese 
culture.21 In reality, Phoenicians were a culturally unified group whose civilization was 
absorbed into Greek and then Roman empires after Alexander the Great conquered the 
                                                 
20 Asher Kaufman, "Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 1920"Middle Eastern 
Studies. 37 (2001), 174. 
21 Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia, 5. 
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Middle East.22  There was no trauma of conquest and retreat into the Mountain, but 
assimilation into Greco-Roman culture.  In the 1920s, the primordial construction of 
Phoenicia became extremely useful for the Maronite Christians of Mount Lebanon to 
construct a nationalist foundation myth.  Phoeniciaism allowed the Maronites to 
politically distance themselves from the Arabist movements in Greater Syria, and create a 
distinctly Lebanese identity. 
This specific historical construction stems from one of the aspects of Lebanon’s 
makeup, that of its multiple confession groups.  Most cities in the Middle East housed 
several confession groups, such as, Muslims, Catholics, Jews, Greek Orthodox, and 
during the nineteenth century most cities had a Muslim majority.  In Lebanon, there was 
a large number of Maronite Christians and Druze who added a local twist onto the usual 
social and political confessional negotiations.  In the Ottoman era, Christians were a 
significant portion of the population in Beirut and the mountains, and they slowly moved 
into the urban areas due to instability in Mount Lebanon and Syria.23  Leila Fawaz 
estimates that in the 1830s that Christians constituted half of the population of Beirut, but 
that by 1860 they constituted a numerical majority, and by the 1910 were fully two thirds 
of the population.24  These Christians were of numerous different confessions, 
predominantly Greek Orthodox, Maronites and Greek Catholics. 
Maronite Christian businessmen were able to use religious lines of association to 
work with French merchants, as the Maronite Church was (and remains) in confession 
                                                 
22 Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia, 4. 
23 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, 4, 46. 
24 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, 48-49. 
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with the Roman Catholic Church.  The European trade in the region was predominantly 
French, moving raw materials from Levantine ports to Marseille.  European merchants 
were able to use consular protection maintain a privileged place in trade, and local 
businessmen were eager to attach themselves to Europeans so that this consular 
protection would be extended to them and exempt the merchants from taxes.  Small-scale 
Christian businessmen found an effective niche as middlemen between European 
merchants and local traders or silk producers in the mid-nineteenth century.25  These 
Christian men could act as interpreters, dragomen, protégés and agents for European 
merchants and could often accumulate enough wealth and connections in such positions 
to enter into businesses (such as the silk industry), themselves.  From these initial forays 
into trade, successful businessmen could consolidate into a commercial house that kept 
the trade contracts with Europeans in the family, increasing their wealth and standing.  
Excepting Ottoman appointed state-officials, the commercial and political actors were 
one and the same in the city.  Merchants secured a place on the civic council to influence 
both trade and politics.   
Some Muslim families were able to follow a similar trajectory, such as the 
powerful Bayhum family which retained a central position in Lebanese politics and 
business for a century.  However, the large-scale trade with Europe was run 
predominantly by Christians; only three of twenty-nine commercials houses trading with 
England in the 1840s were Muslim.26  Muslims merchants often provided the connection 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, 98. 
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to the interior for Christian merchants, and ran the goods trade on the road to Damascus, 
or south to Hawran.  This trade generated important connections, but not the sort of gross 
wealth accumulated by urban merchants involved in the silk trade.  The growing 
dynamics between Muslim and Christian business interests should not be viewed as 
directly in competition with each other or diametrically opposed; there were numerous 
cross-confessional business relationships.  However, it was also clear that starting in the 
1850s and continuing under the French mandate, Christians were able to use their 
confessional ties to create lucrative business connections, putting them at the top of a new 
class of wealthy merchants in the city.  These merchants operated through the port, but 
until the second half of the 19
th
 century, Beirut was nothing more than a minor port of 
call that participated in small-scale regional trade.  
 
THE BEGINNING OF LONG-DISTANCE TRADE 
As explained, the port in St. George’s Bay suffers from shallow water and 
minimal protection from winds, so it has required man-made construction to make it an 
effective shipping center since the Roman era.27  Despite the existence of a port since 
ancient times, Beirut did not experience the high volume of trade that was seen in the 
inland centers such as Aleppo and Damascus era until after 1850.28  During the age of 
sail, commercial merchants could only get insurance for their goods from 3 May to 13 
                                                 
27 Jean Laugenie, “Le Port de Beyrouth” Revue de Geographie de Lyon (31:4, 1956), 274. 
28 Brant William Downes, Constructing the modern ottoman waterfront: Salonica and Beirut in the late 
nineteenth century (Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 2008), 69 
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September.29  The winter months were considered too dangerous for shipping, as the 
wrecks stranded outside the bay testified.30   Inland centers benefitted from the textile and 
grain trade, but these overland routes had no need to go thorough Beirut.  The trade to 
Beirut generally ran on two main line: one over the mountain to Damascus and another 
that ran up and down the coast.31  The long range trips to Europe were growing, but did 
not yet constitute a significant portion of the trade.  The traffic that the port saw was 
usually small Ottoman sailing ships conducting short hops along the Ottoman coastline.  
Long range travel from Europe was rare before the 1850s, although some larger ships 
came through to load up on Lebanese silk, most of the boats moved goods along the ports 
of the Levant and Anatolia.  
The turning point in Beirut’s fortunes occurred during Egyptian rule of the 
Levant, after Ibrahim Pasha occupied Beirut in 1832.32  At the time, Beirut was a small 
town with around 12-15,000 people and little municipal administration.33  In keeping 
with Egyptian reform programs, Ibrahim appointed a civilian council to act as a 
governing body for the city, made up of the local elites and growing merchant class.  
Along with Egyptian officers, the council worked to improve the public sanitation 
(sewage and irrigation) and infrastructure (roadwork and new paved streets).  But most 
importantly for Beirut’s economy, Ibrahim Pasha ordered port improvements, 
                                                 
29 Samir Kassir, Histoire De Beyrouth (Paris: 2004), 110. 
30 Mediterranean Pilot Volume IV, 590. 
31 Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, "Quarantine and Trade: The Case of Beirut, 1831-1840," International Journal of 
Maritime History (19 (2): 223, 2007), 241. 
32 Samir Kassir, Histoire De Beyrouth (Paris: 2004), 103. 
33 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, Table 1, p. 126.  Fawaz notes that the provided population estimates 
should be used with caution, as there were no reliable statistical methods for gathering census data, and 
figures were often approximate, Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, 28. 
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constructing a quarantine station and new warehouses for goods.34  These improvements 
drew the attention of and impressed the British and French consular representatives, and 
eventually attracted more foreign-based trade to Beirut in lieu of other, out-modeled 
ports.35  The port slowly developed due to small-scale projects, such as a new customs 
house, sheds for goods, a docking basin for barges, and a lighthouse.36   
The concentration of facilities in the city resulted in Beirut slowly becoming a 
central stop for trade on the Levantine coast.  However, the turning point was the 
construction of a lazaretto in Beirut.  The early and mid-1800s were characterized by 
constant outbreaks of plague and cholera which had devastating effects on the population 
and economy of urban centers.  There were reports of plague outbreaks in Beirut in 1813, 
1816, 1836, 1827, 1829 and 1831.37  In earlier centuries, when an epidemic broke out at 
one port city, commerce would shift to other ports of call until the disease had passed.  
However, in the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire expanded its role in the state 
control of the populace and commerce.  Due to growing fears of disease, the Ottoman 
Empire slowly increased bureaucratic regulation of public sanitation, and ships coming 
into Ottoman territory had to stop at a quarantine station in order to prevent transmission 
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of epidemics.38  To this the, Ibrahim Pasha built a lazaretto outside of Beirut that opened 
in 1834.   
The twelve day quarantine station in Beirut had numerous bureaucratic problems, 
and did not always prevent disease (as when cholera hit Beirut in 1838, 1848 and 1865), 
but there were no other quarantine stations on the Levantine coast.39  For the first time, 
the central government provided a fixed point of contact for trade in the Levant.40  
Toufoul Abou-Hodeib argues that Ibrahim established the lazaretto not only to ameliorate 
the disastrous effects of disease on commerce, but also to control and redirect the flow of 
trade.41  Trade that once diffused from Istanbul and Marseilles to Alexandretta, Latakia, 
Sidon, Tyre, Haifa and Jaffa now funneled into Beirut.  After Ibrahim erected the 
lazaretto, all European ships bound for Syria had to stop at Beirut for quarantine.42  As 
Beirut’s trade expanded, local merchants made connections with European businessmen, 
foreign consular representation solidified their presence in Beirut, and the small city 
began to develop international diplomatic and business links with the rest of the 
Mediterranean.   
As European trade grew, Beirut was a site of competition between French and 
British run companies; firms constantly struggled to acquire resources and secure 
transportation concessions, like ports, railways and oil pipelines.  This economic contest 
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would be essentially important in developing Beirut’s port and in the development of the 
merchant class in Beirut.  One of the reasons for the start of this trade competition in 
Beirut was that previous to the 1830s, Beirut had truly been a commercial backwater, and 
therefore there were no established foreign commercial interests there.  Many of the 
major cities in the Levant had trade regulated by the echelles system.  Echelles was the 
term used in the first French Capitulation agreements between the Ottoman Porte and the 
European powers in the 16
th
 century.  It referred to an Ottoman port city that was bound 
to regulated trade agreements with the French. The coastal cities of the Levant and 
Anatolia were labeled echelles, and developed into a system which created a protected 
“free trade zone” for French merchants, ultimately resulting in practices which privileged 
French businessmen, who later extended their privileges into insulated consular practices 
in these cities.  Beirut, not being a center of trade when the Capitulation agreements were 
originally fashioned, was never legislated under the echelles system.43  The economy and 
local merchants therefore benefitted from the unfettered competition between British and 
French interests.   
Furthermore, Beirut was not a seat of Ottoman government, so there was no direct 
oversight on the town.  During the mid-nineteenth century, Beirut’s administrative 
oversight came from Damascus, Sidon or Acre.44  The local governmental representation 
in these other cities never gained significant influence over the administration of Beirut, 
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because the civilian council successfully maneuvered to counter their power.45  With the 
combination of these auspicious factors, European entrepreneurs saw business 
opportunities in Beirut, and European governments saw opportunities for influencing the 
Ottoman Empire.  Beirut experienced a sudden expansion of foreign merchants, as when 
trade began to build up in the 1830s, there was also a sudden increase in foreign consular 
representation.46  Both the French and British wanted to be able to have a governmental 
presence on-hand in order to secure their countries’ commercial interests.   
 
Figure 2: Postcard of the port 
 
 Beirut linked into Mediterranean trade precisely when maritime trade was rapidly 
expanding due to the technological advances in engineering.  The introduction of 
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steamships rather than sailing vessels resulted in shorter travel time and longer seasons of 
travel.  The first steamship arrived in Beirut in September 1835 from Istanbul, and British 
steamers from London reached Beirut by 1837.47  Of course, there was not an immediate 
transfer of all ships over to steam, and sailboats continued to be in the majority of ships 
seen in the port for until the 1870s. But the steamships expanded the possibilities of trade 
to Beirut and throughout the entire Mediterranean.  Steamships could carry more tonnage, 
and cut travel time in half.  As Charles Issawi computes, the average commercial sailing 
time from Liverpool to Beirut was 41-42 days in 1851; in 1856 those same 5000 miles 
took only 28 days for propeller steamers.48   The technological changes allowed for the 
rise of massive and lucrative shipping lines; the Austrian Lloyd of Trieste and the 
Messageries Maritimes of France were both founded in 1837.49  These two lines would 
dominate trade in the Levant for the next hundred years, and the port of Beirut would 
often struggle to accommodate the size and the number of steamers from these 
companies. 
Linked with the rise of steamships was the growth of tourism, which would later 
grow into a booming business that spawned hotels, touring companies, and passenger 
ship routes from Europe into the Levant and Egypt.  Tourist came to Beirut to see the 
hybrid European and Middle Eastern city in the Levant, and also to travel to the Roman 
ruins of Baalbek.  Later tourist companies in the twentieth century would make Beirut a 
stop on an tour of the Middle East which featured the lost past of the Romans and the 
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Pharaohs in Egypt, and emphasized the wild exoticism of the Middle East.50 Slowly, it 
was not just goods which came out of the port, but also European tourists who were the 
first wave of people who saw Lebanon as an adventure vacation destination.  One visitor 
stated, “Beirut is the premier port of Syria, its population can only increase from day to 
day, communications with Europe are easier there, European protection more effective, 
the cost of living less.”51  Both the tourists and expanded French and British trade in the 
age of industrial shipping resulted in continued expansion into the 1840s and 1850s.  By 
the 1850s, French consular representatives and residents in Beirut reported that Beirut’s 
commerce had surpassed Tripoli and Sidon, and had taken “possession of the entire 
coast.”52    
 
                                                 
50 Kassir, 306. 
51 Letter, Father Jean-Francois Badour to Father Pieter Beck, 2 September 1853 quoted in Kassir, Histoire, 
110. 
52 Letter from Father Jean-Francois Badour to Father Pieter Becks, 3 September 1853, quoted in Kuri, Une 
historie du Liban, 2:117. 
 23 
 
Figure 3: The Vilayet of Beirut in 1888.53 
 
 Despite the growth of the port, Beirut’s potential trade suffered from its isolation 
from Greater Syria, which it was separated from by the land barrier of the mountains.  
The mountains in eastern Lebanon can easily be conquered by a car or bus today, but in 
the late 1800s the only land route to Damascus was a steep, two-day road that had to be 
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negotiated by pack animals.54  The goods coming into the port could only reach 
Damascus and Greater Syria through this arduous route which resulted in slow 
transportation and frequent losses to accidents and bandits.  Business with the interior 
was a risky venture with high costs and frequent catastrophic losses.  Count Edmund de 
Perthuis (1822-1904), who settled in Syria in 1848 where he worked for Messageries 
Maritimes (then called the Messageries Imperiales), quickly realized that an easily 
negotiable road could be a lucrative investment.55   
De Perthuis looked at two potential routes to Damascus, one that would be steep 
and potentially less defensible from bandits, or a longer and safer route which would go 
through Sidon.  Local elites knew that the concentration of infrastructure in Beirut had 
been one of the main reasons it quickly developed as a trading center, and so they 
preferred the direct route to Damascus, which would bypass Sidon, definitively 
neutralizing it as a potential threat and an alternative trade route.  They therefore 
intervened with de Perthuis to sway the decision towards the hazardous direct route, 
which he presented to Istanbul.  The Sublime Porte granted de Perthuis the carriageway 
concession in 1857, leading to the creation of a joint share company, the Compagnie 
Imperiale Ottomane de la route Beyrouth à Damas.56  Completed in 1863, the road was 
beneficial for both cities, and suddenly brought Damascus within a day’s travel of a 
growing Mediterranean port.  The local Beiruti municipality’s intervention in this case 
demonstrates their understanding of the city’s regional role in trade, and the potentially 
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precarious position they were in.  The new direct route worked to position Beirut above 
Sidon.  It also indicated their ability to influence major French investments, and to 
involve itself with the larger politics of negotiating concessionary agreements.  The local 
elite’s understanding of the importance of bringing and controlling advances in 
transportation and trade are seen again and again in the battle over the port concession. 
BUILDING A PORT (1860-1888) 
With the new route to Damascus drawing more goods into the port and the 
increased tourism into Beirut, the port traffic outstripped the ability of the facilities to 
accommodate it, and by the 1860s, the port was in desperate need of another renovation.  
As the French consul noted, “Beirut is only an entrepôt.  This city can only remain or 
grow through the construction of the port.”57  However, financial and geographic 
difficulties emerged.  Even with the road, Beirut’s geographic position behind mountains 
made it a poor choice for a large port city, and the port area itself was not enough of a 
natural harbor to make the construction easy.  In addition to the geographic problems, 
there were divided local interests in developing the port, as a section of the city’s 
merchants were opposed to the project, fearing that the port would bring new taxes to 
bear on the residents.58   
 The first concentrated push for construction of a new port came from the 
Messageries Maritimes, who entreated the French government to conduct a study of the 
potential expansion of the port.  Emile-Charles Guepratte, a naval officer, developed a 
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preliminary plan for a port in 1860.59  Edmund de Perthuis, who at this point was both 
eagerly awaiting the completion of his road-way between Beirut and Damascus, and was 
still attached to the Messageries, jumped at the prospect of a new port.60  Using 
Guepratte’s plan, the Messageries and de Perthuis presented the proposal to Istanbul, but 
were rejected.  The Sublime Porte had just given him the roadway concession, and saw 
the increasing encroachment of the Great Powers in the trade economy of the Levant as a 
threat.  Instead of selling the concession away to enrich their coffers, Istanbul decided to 
re-entrench their coasts, establish control over new maritime projects in order to 
strengthen state rule, and limit the direct control of foreign companies.61  This was an 
empire-wide project, however, Beirut saw direct impact from the new policies; the Porte 
had no intention of granting another joint-share concession, but did not have the capital to 
spare on Beirut itself. Istanbul therefore refused the Messageries’ plans, deeming it better 
to stall significant renovations rather than show their weakness and the French’s ability 
and economic strength by granting them the concession.   
The battle over a concession for the port became the site of competition over 
control of Beirut, both politically and economically.  The city’s economy was 
intrinsically linked to the fortunes of the port; there was no potential of economic 
development without it.  Locally based French investors such as Count Edmund de 
Perthuis were determined that the port of Beirut would be their gateway into the Levant.  
                                                 
59 May Davie, Beyrouth: 1825- 975  U                  ’  b      (Beirut: Ordre des Inenieurs et des 
Architectes, 2001), 34 
60 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, 68. 
61 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1876-1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 50-52. 
 27 
A French financed and controlled port would open the door for increased trade, allow 
French companies control over the port spaces themselves (undercutting pre-existing 
guilds), and allow the French to get the upper hand in the Anglo-French economic 
competition in the Levant.  On the other hand, Istanbul needed to avoid unilateral French 
control of the port at all costs.  It would be an important economic opening to Europe, but 
would undermine any agency or control the Porte had of its maritime trade on the coast of 
the Levant. 
Instead of granting the concession, Istanbul contented itself with minor 
renovations (a new lighthouse, a new customs house) to delay the issue.  However, many 
local Beiruti merchants whose fortunes were increasingly dependent on European trade, 
found this compromise to be wholly insufficient.  Local merchants and the municipality 
appealed to the provincial governor in Damascus in 1868 to authorize new port 
construction to no avail.62  Failing in this endeavor, local business leaders petitioned 
Istanbul in 1879 for a new port concession to be granted to Beirut.63  After being rejected 
by Istanbul again, the municipality collected investments from local merchants to a sum 
of 20,000 Lira, and then contacted the Banque Imperiale Ottomane (BIO)64 with a 
proposal for a new port.65  However, at this time, BIO was not interested in involving 
itself, and without the support of either the government or a major corporation, there was 
no way to locally fund the port.  These failed attempts showed that the municipality, the 
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elites and the merchants (who were often composed of the same notable families) used 
multiple paths of negotiation to attempt to get a new port in Beirut.  Each attempt 
exhibited an increasing investment by the local elites, as they moved up the ladder of 
appeals to the Sultan and then invested their own money to tempt BIO.   They had a 
quotidian understanding of Beirut’s new status as an economic center within the Ottoman 
Empire, and their connection and reliance on European international shipping.  But 
despite their impassioned involvement in the project, it also proved that the local Beiruiti 
leaders and businesses were not yet able to influence state politics, or to sway 
international business.  Untimely, their failure proved that it would take more powerful 
players to change the fortunes of Beirut. 
The years dragged on with the Porte blocking attempts at negotiating a 
concession.  Finally, the French investors developed a work-around strategy that would 
allow Istanbul the appearance of keeping the port construction in-house while in fact 
delivering the concession to the original French group.  The story of the Beirut 
concession is often seen as proof of local agency over the encroaching power of the 
foreigners.  As the triumphant story is told, a Lebanese native, Joseph Moutran, received 
the concession in 1887, securing for Beirut what several foreign companies had tried and 
failed to obtain.66  The reality of the story was a little different.  This was an instance of 
local agency, but one in which the local merchants allied with French capital in order to 
bring infrastructure developments and foreign trade, not a rejection of French control.  
The major player in this story was not Moutran but de Perthuis, who, after 24 years of 
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attempting to get the concession, had grown tired of the intransigence of the Porte.  He 
allied himself (for a considerable sum of money) with a Syrian named Selim Malhame, 
who happened to be the director of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.67  Malhame 
did not want his name on the project, so contacted a landowner and minor government 
official of dwindling fortunes from Baalbek who worked in Beirut, by the name of Joseph 
Moutran.  Moutran went to Istanbul in his stead to negotiate.  Moutran had only a passing 
interest in ports, and even less knowledge of large-scale engineering, but had a pressing 
interest Malhame’s promise to settle his debts, so traveled to Istanbul in order to secure 
the concession.  Finally, de Perthuis was able to play a perfect hand; Istanbul had 
recognized that they were going to be unable to provide the financial backing for the port 
and so were willing to listen to proposals. Moutran’s position as the intermediary allowed 
them the pretense of giving the concession to a local, and the various large bribes in 
francs paid to several members of the Ottoman administration were much more 
convincing than the 20,000 Lira sums.  De Perthuis’s man in Istanbul finally obtained the 
concession by imperial firman on 11 June 1887 which authorized the formation of a 
company to improve the port. 68 
Moutran handed the concession to de Perthuis, who created and ran the 
consortium of the Compagnie Imperiale Ottomane du Port, des Quais et des Entrepots de 
Beyrouth.69  This French-run entity began work on updating the port along the lines of 
                                                 
67 Brant William Downes, Constructing the modern ottoman waterfront, 170 
68 Jean Laugenie, “Le Port de Beyrouth” Revue de geographie de Lyon (31:4, 1956), 276. 
69 A combination of the Ottoman Bank, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the Comptoir d’Escompte de 
Paris, the Compangine des Messageries Maritimes and the Compagnie Imperiale Ottoman de la Route 
Beyrouth a Damas. 
 30 
the original plans, developed twenty-four years previously.70   While this concession was 
a coup for the French investors, it also ameliorated Ottoman concerns, allowing them to 
appear to have given the work to Lebanese investors, even if it was a fairly thin fiction.  
Ultimately, the French had won the battle with the Porte, and while there would be minor 
skirmishes over control in the future, the regulation of maritime trade was a solidly 
French endeavor.71  While the local merchants had to give up control of the waterfront, 
they had a new port and new that they would see increased commerce through Beirut, 
which they would participate in a profit from.  Unlike major European cities with large 
ports such as London, Stockholm and Marseille which saw continuous maritime 
development to complement economic growth and technical innovation, Beirut saw first 
stagnation and then rapid expansion imposed by French capital.72   
The physical space of the waterfront was completely transformed.  The completed 
port (delayed due to complications of weather and disease), opened in October of 1895.  
The old port had been 150 meters by 100 meters, with a two-meter depth.  Larger ships 
were required to moor fairly far out from the port, and harbor front space was always at a 
premium.  The new port, significantly to the east, had an 800 meter by 350 meter pier and 
breakwater (respectively), greater depth, and a fifty two acre dock area with numerous 
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warehouses.73   Beyond the port itself, there was a new quarantine house, new customs 
houses, and improved and expanded areas for harbor police.  The old port was filled in, 
the old wharf became a street, and private docking facilities, were shut in deference to the 
monopoly on maritime traffic held by the port.  Beirut was seeing both a physical 
transformation and increased administrative regularization of space on the waterfront.   
This was altogether a sudden and fantastic change in the fabric of Beirut’s 
waterfront in the space of only a few years.  However, that did not mean that it was 
immediately successful, and in the first few years of opening, the port operated at a loss.  
In order to pay for the port facilities, there were heavy import taxes, fees and tariffs.  The 
fees adversely affected the Beiruti merchants who acted as middlemen in the trade from 
the hinterland to and from Europe (most of whom advocated for the port), but the boom 
in traffic more than made up any cuts in their profits.  However, owners of small scale 
shipping operations that made coastal hops were more severely affected, as they could 
not easily expand their fleet to take advantage of the new port.  While the large ocean 
liners had no choice but to go through the new port, local merchants with smaller vessels 
had more options.  After the opening and imposition of associated fees, a number of 
merchants began a boycott and sent their goods through Tripoli, or bribed Ottoman 
officials to allow them to let their goods off at the coastlines and avoid the edifice of the 
port.74  This continued to be a problem into 1900, when an American Consul in Beirut 
wrote, 
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It should be remarked that Beirut did not share equally with the rest of the country 
in the growth of the import trade.  The local Societe Imperiale Ottoman du Port, 
des Quays et des Entrepots de Beyrouth, a French corporation which built the 
famous Beirut harbor some ten years ago, levies such heavy tributes on shipping 
and merchandise that much of the trade that formerly centered in Beirut as a 
distributing point for nearly all of Syria and Palestine, now seeks other ports of 
entry.75 
 
Clearly, the port authority was unable to reach a détente between lowering its fees and 
being able to make a profit after the enormous expense of building the new port, which 
resulted in a rejection in the use of the port by some merchants if they could find another 
port or a means to smuggle their goods ashore.  The balance between tariffs and demands 
for free trade were a repeated theme the he negotiation between the merchants, the port 
company and the state into the 1930s. 
Despite the continuing problems posed from balancing revenues with tariffs, the 
port propelled Beirut into a place of centrality in the region, a decade after the Ottoman 
government approved Beirut’s petition to become a regional capital in Greater Syria in 
1888.76  However, Beirut’s move into a central place of the Levant was primarily an 
economic one.  First the lazaretto made Beirut a fixed point of commerce in the Levant, 
literally a ‘must-see’ stop for ships entering the Levant.  The growth of foreign trade 
caused the rise of a merchant class that was increasingly internationally oriented.  This 
merchant class understood the importance of Beirut’s place as a central node for trade, 
and worked with French investors to make it the only stop on the roadway to Damascus.  
Furthermore, local merchants understood the importance of Beirut as a gateway between 
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the east and the west, petitioning the Ottoman Sultan to allow for a port concession that 
would privilege the growth of local Beiruti commerce over economic competition 
between the Ottoman state and French economic incursion.  Their successes made Beirut 
the largest port city in the Levant by 1900. 
But although Beirut imagined itself as an urban capital, it did not yet achieve 
unquestioned supremacy over the region.  The port cities continued to be an important 
site of competition between commercial interests, especially between the British and 
French infrastructure and transportation companies which entrenched their investments 
along the coast in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 77  The culmination of 
European involvement in the Levant would come with the creation of the Mandatory 
governments of Britain and France after World War I.78  After the establishment of the 
Mandates, the local businesses negotiated paths of influence with the French Mandatory 
administration rather than the Ottoman government, and Beirut competed not with Sidon 
or the hinterland, but with the southern coastal town of Haifa. 
SECURING THE RAILWAY (1870-1920) 
After the establishment of the new port in Beirut, the Beiruti elites continued to 
negotiate to push Beirut to the center of transportation projects.  In the case of 
                                                 
77 Between 1890 and 1915, Europeans invested about 13.5 million French Francs in the Beirut Port, and 
over 79.6 million French Francs in various European controlled railway projects, including the Beirut-
Damascus railway.  See: Carolyn Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy 
(Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, New York, 1998), 
18. 
78 The British Mandate of Palestine encompassed the areas of Palestine and Transjordan (current day Israel, 
Palestine and Jordan).  The French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon encompassed the areas of the State of 
Damascus, Greater Lebanon, Jebel Druze, the Alawite State, the State of Aleppo and the Sanjak of 
Alexandretta (current day Lebanon and Syria). 
 34 
establishing railways in the Levant, Beirut competed with several other cities in an 
attempt to secure the contracts for Beirut.  Despite the existence of the port, Beirut was 
not the most logical city to concentrate regional links in.  The mountain barrier between 
Beirut and the agricultural areas of Greater Syria and Damascus presented a significant 
challenge to any rail link.  Beirut’s centrality was by no means assured during the early 
twentieth century, and European developers continued to look for other potential sites of 
development.  Beiruti merchants and French investors fought to continue Beirut’s 
accumulation of regional trade routes, and to secure the railway concession for Beirut. 
 In the late 1880s, numerous investors looked at the possibility of opening up the 
Levant to railway exploitation.  With their new port built, Beirutis in the growing town of 
100,000 were well aware that developing swift land connections to the interior was an 
essential next step to securing Beirut’s economic interests on the coast.79  As early as 
1884, the Beiruti-born Chief Engineer in the province of Syria, Bishara Dib, advocated 
for local participation and involvement in promoting Beirut as a railway stop.  He wrote 
to the governor general in Damascus, “We cannot wait until the foreign capitalists take 
over, we need subscription committees in Beirut, Damascus and elsewhere to raise a 
good part of the necessary money.”80  While Dib attempted to galvanize the Beiruti 
merchants into pooling their money, the elites of Tripoli also organized a fund in an 
attempt to secure a railway contract for their own city.  French-born investor and 
engineer Edouard Coze (who previously was an administrator at Credit Franco-Egyptian 
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and the Gas Company of Beirut), wanted Tripoli as the terminus of a rail line that 
connected to Aleppo, Homes and Hama.81  The Tripoli line never got past the planning 
stage, but the more serious threat came from the British investor Lawrence Oliphant who 
developed a plan for a Damascus-Haifa railway link.  Haifa did not possess a port the size 
of Beirut’s, but in the late 1870s, the Ottoman government succeeded in building roads 
and carriageways that linked Haifa to the other significant urban centers in Palestine (like 
Nazareth and Acre), and to the agricultural interior.82  Furthermore, the route to Haifa 
would pass directly through the Syrian agricultural plains of Hawran, and would not have 
to contend with the Lebanese mountains.  The introduction of Haifa as an alternative 
immediately caused the concern that port traffic for the agricultural exports of the Levant 
could be lost to the south. 
 Additionally, the Sublime Porte was predisposed towards giving the concession to 
Haifa.  After the development of the port of Beirut under de Perthuis, the Ottoman 
government planned to build a major port at Haifa to counter the rise of Beirut.  Although 
Beirut was officially still a part of the Ottoman Empire, officials realized that the 
transportation infrastructure there had slipped out of their control after the port 
concession, and the port served local Beiruti and European investment interests rather 
than Ottoman concerns.83  Fearing for the security of the Levantine coastline, and 
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attempting to get a foothold on maritime trade within their borders, the Ottoman 
government planned a significant commercial port at Haifa.  In the decades that followed, 
just as the Ottoman government had been unable to invest in and execute a port at Beirut 
earlier, it failed to launch a Haifian port as well.  At the moment of deciding the railway 
concession, the Sublime Porte saw Haifa as an attractive alternative to the concentration 
of resources in French hands in Beirut, and construction on a Damascus - Haifa line 
started in 1892.84 
The head of the port investment, de Perthuis, saw any investment in Haifa as a 
potential menace to the fortunes of his port being constructed in Beirut, and rallied to 
counter the proposal with a Beirut-Damascus rail line which would parallel his roadway.  
However, de Perthuis and his front companies could not secure the Beirut-Damascus line 
due to British maneuvering and the refusal of the Sublime Porte to concentrate all the 
contracts in his hands.  Fortunately for de Perthuis, the merchants of Beirut also saw the 
rail link to Haifa as a danger to the fortunes of their city, even as they had successfully 
begun construction on their port.  The start of construction on the Damascus-Haifa line 
mobilized the local elites of Beirut to action.  Just as with the port concession, the amount 
of capital needed for a major infrastructure project far outstripped the Beiruti’s ability to 
raise the money themselves.  Beiruti elites quickly realized the impossibility of paying for 
the rail line, and focused on their ability to influence and petition the Sultan. To organize 
their negotiation with the state, the municipal council met at the house of the powerful 
merchant Muhyi al-Din Bayhum in February 1890.  The Bayhums were one of the few 
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Muslim families who had been able to tie their business to European merchants and make 
their fortune.  An entrenched family in Syria and Lebanon, they had been local merchants 
and landowners for some centuries.  When foreign trade expanded, the Bayhums had 
their hand in buying and selling an assortment of goods such as grain, spices, cotton, and 
most profitably, silk.85  With their vast fortune, the members of the Bayhum family often 
served on the municipal council and were respected among the city merchants.  Bayhum 
brought the council together to develop a plan of attack.  The local merchants and elites 
knew their personal capital would never make up enough money to build the railway, and 
the coffers of Beirut were tapped out on the municipal budget.  Unable to get a rail line 
through capital investment, the Bayhum family focused on simply securing the 
concession from the Sublime Porte without worrying about how to fund the project later.  
From 1889-1892, they sent telegraphs to the Sublime Porte, warning that they feared that 
the rise of Haifa would adversely affect Beirut’s fortunes.86  They furthermore pointed 
out that the Haifa railway would pass through land owned by the Sultan, attempting to 
cast the rail line to Haifa as a challenge to the Sultan’s control over the interior of the 
Levant.87   
Knowing from their experience with the port concession that their pleas to the 
Sultan might not sway him to the side of Beirut, the merchants and the Bayhum family 
went directly to de Perthuis.  With the blessing of the municipal council, Bayhum allied 
with de Perthuis to develop another front-man operation, like the one that had succeeded 
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with Joseph Moutran and the port concession.  In 1891, de Perthuis’ Compagnie de la 
Route Beyrouth-Damas created the Société Ottomane de la Voie Ferrée Économiques de 
Beyrouth à Damas, and put Hassan Bayhum at the head of the company.  The Société de 
la Voie Ferrée de Beyrouth à Damas’ engineers quickly drew up plans for a route over 
the mountains to Beirut that Bayhum could present to the Sultan as an alternative to 
Haifa.  The incessant lobbying from Beirut and the appearance of handing the concession 
to an established Beiruti family successfully convinced the Sultan to accede to a railway 
concession.    
On 3 June 1891, the Sultan handed Hassan Bayhum and his company the 
concession for a railway on de Perthuis’ original plan.  Bayhum immediately sold the 
concession and ‘his’ company, Société Ottomane de la Voie Ferrée Économiques de 
Beyrouth à Damas, to de Perthuis, who re-merged it with the Compagnie de la Route 
Beyrouth-Damas.  At the same time, Joseph Moutran was able to secure a concession to a 
Damasucus-Hawran rail line as the front man to yet another company, Société Ottomane 
de la Voie Ferrée Économiques de Syrie.88  In 1893, de Perthuis’ Compagnie de la Route 
Beyrouth-Damas conglomerate merged with Joseph Moutran’s company to create Société 
Anonyme Ottomane des Chemins de fer de Beyrouth-Damas-Hawran en Syrie.  Finally, 
after all of these deceptive stratagems, de Perthuis held four separate road and rail 
concessions under one single conglomerate which could now build a railway route 
between Beirut to Damascus and down to Hawran’s grain rich plains. 
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It is unclear if the Sublime Porte was actually fooled by de Perthuis’ brand of 
smoke and mirrors, or if Istanbul truly believed that the concessions were all reaching 
different hands.  Several things are clear though; the first being that lobbying of the 
Sultan by the native elite for a concession was ultimately successful in securing an 
imperial firman where de Perthuis had failed.  The second was that the Beiruti notables 
were galvanized by the possibility of the threat of the railway to Haifa, fearing that the 
loss of Hawran’s agricultural crop to the south would be a blow to their new port. 
Thirdly, the Beiruti merchants were fully cognizant that they were concentrating all the 
economic power in de Perthuis’ hands, but found this infinitely more amenable to losing 
out to Haifa.  And finally, it is clear that the railroad was not a profitable venture, but a 
political one.  In the early years of the railroad, it operated at a considerable loss.89  This 
is not all together surprising, considering that both the railroad and the port opened within 
a few years of each other, before the market for grain exports had a chance to catch up to 
the supply.  But both the local elites and de Perthuis were already playing the long game, 
and realized that they needed to move to secure the concession before Haifa or any other 
city had the opportunity to divert the flow of regional trade in the Levant. 
After World War I, and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, these basic 
competitions and internal negotiations continued in the region, but under new borders.  
When the European powers redrew the borders of the Middle East in preparation for the 
mandatory governments, they dissolved the province in which Beirut had been the 
regional capital, and established the French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon.  The Vilayet 
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of Beirut was split between the British and the French powers, and the French Mandate 
established the state of Greater Lebanon on 29 August 1920.  The city of Haifa was 
removed from Beirut’s provincial administration and placed under British Mandatory 
rule.  While the resource competition was the same as in Ottoman times, under the 
Mandatory powers the economic competition became direct governmental competition 
between the Mandatory governments of Britain and France. 
 
Figure 4: Syria and Lebanon during the French Mandate, circa 1930.90 
  
                                                 
90 Shambrook, French Imperialism, xii. 
 41 
Chapter 2: The Rise of Haifa (1918-39) 
 In the early years of the British Mandate, the city of Haifa would have been 
generally recognizable to a resident who had lived there one hundred years before.  But 
from 1918-1939, the demographic and physical character of the city rapidly and suddenly 
changed.91  Although Haifa possessed a natural harbor with proximity to an agricultural 
hinterland, it lacked a significant population before the twentieth century, meaning the 
development of the port infrastructure came later than other Levantine shipping centers.92 
While the city population grew internally due to improved conditions of health 
and sanitation, the most significant reason for this change was the swift migration and 
emigration into the city of Haifa.  Official census records put the population of Haifa at 
24,634 in 1922 and 50,403 in 1931, showing that the population had almost doubled in 
less than ten years.93  The immigrants were made up of Muslim migrants from the rural 
agricultural areas of Palestine and Jewish immigrants from Europe, especially from 
Poland and Germany.  These new Jewish immigrants drastically changed the composition 
of the city.  Haifa was a city with mixed confessions since the nineteenth century, 
inhabited by a large European Christian population and a small Sephardic Jewish 
population.  In the twentieth century, the proportions of Jews in the city grew rapidly; 
Jews made up one fourth of the population in 1922 and one third in 1931.  The 
immigrants who headed to Palestine legally and illegally were usually educated and 
financially stable enough to make the journey.  In this prewar period they could bring 
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their money and assets with them, and were able to reestablish themselves in the growing 
town of Haifa, changing the historic demographic and economic distribution. 
 The Jewish immigrants to Haifa were able to use their personal capital and the 
support network of the Zionist Organization to establish themselves in the industrial 
sector of Haifa.  More aptly, the immigrants created the industrial sector in Haifa, which 
had not been a significant part of the Haifan economy before World War I.  Although 
both the town and the transportation network grew under Ottoman rule, agricultural 
goods were Haifa’s only export, and the city was a classic case of exporting raw materials 
while importing European manufactured goods through the port.94  Through private 
investment in the sectors of construction and industry, Jewish immigrants were able to 
develop a solid industrial platform in Haifa.  These new sectors quickly surpassed the 
existing Arab industry which was based on supply lines and economic relationships 
recently put under stress by the new Mandatory borders.95 
 The British Mandate quickly realized the possibilities of the new Jewish industrial 
sector and encouraged its economic growth.  Throughout the 1920s, the British 
Administration coordinated with the Zionist Organization in developing protection 
measures for the new industries.  The Department of Trade and Industry enacted tariff 
protections and customs exceptions for the nascent industrial sector.  These policies 
resulted in a higher cost of living in Haifa, but the British authorities considered this an 
acceptable tradeoff, as they believed it would encourage the modernization of the city. 
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 As private Jewish enterprise caused Haifan economic growth, the British 
government was able to move forward with its plans to make Haifa a central node of 
communication and transit on the coast.  The British authorities had long since identified 
Haifa’s potential as a central transit point.  By 1905 the Hejaz railway linked Haifa to 
Dera’a, an extremely important connection for Haifa’s economic fortunes as it allowed 
swift transportation of the grain from the agricultural plains south to Haifa.96  After 
British investors’ early interest in developing the rail lines to the city and the completion 
of the line of the Hejaz line, the War Office had noted the possibilities for a deep water 
port as early as 1906.  During the late war years in 1917 and 1918, the railway set down 
by the Expeditionary Force linked Haifa to the Palestinian rail system, strengthening its 
internal transit routes in Palestine.97   
The British government envisioned Haifa as an essential part of their modernizing 
and civilizing project, announcing in 1919 that Haifa would attain “the highest degree of 
civilization” under the auspices of the British mandate.98  As reported by a French official 
in Jerusalem, Sir Herbert Samuel summarized the British government’s favorable view 
towards Haifa in a 1925 public statement rejecting the idea of constructing a port at Jaffa.   
“The residents of Jaffa,” declared Sir Herbert Samuel, “base their request on the 
fact that trade in their city is now considerably more considerable than that of 
Haifa, and its population develops rapidly. But Haifa possesses the great natural 
advantage of a partially sheltered bay. Despite the adage that faith moves 
mountains, even that of the Jaffans in their city’s future, cannot carry a Mount 
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Carmel to house their harbor. Secondly, we must remember that Haifa has the 
hinterland of Syria, Transjordan and even Iraq.”99 
 
For the British government, geography and the potential of exponential growth trumped 
the current economic stability of Jaffa.  Despite these lofty plans for Haifa, the 
Mandatory government found it extremely difficult to move forward with any significant 
public works projects, seeing as Palestine did not produce significant revenue for the 
Empire.100  Considering the economic situation of the 1920s and the strapped budget of 
the Palestinian government, there was no way that the state budget could fund such a 
large-scale project.101  
What occurs in Haifa draws an indirect parallel to Beirut’s struggle to develop a 
port.  The Mandatory government could not fund a port, and without financial backing, 
the Crown refused to invest in the project.  Instead of the established Arab merchants 
who organized to petition for a port in Beirut, the Jewish Haifan merchants saw that a 
modern port could significantly improve the industrial sector in Haifa, and were eager to 
benefit from such a large construction project.  Prominent industrialists and businessmen 
joined together under the umbrella of the Zionist Organization to present their proposal 
and arguments for a port to the governor of British Palestine. With the influx of Jewish 
capital and the development of a growing industrial sector, the Mandatory power was 
able to argue in the corridors of Whitehall that investing in Haifa could help turn 
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Palestine into a profitable possession for Great Britain, and that it would encourage 
modernization and civilization in Palestine by establishing European investors there.  
Through these tactics, the Mandate was able to secure a significant loan from the Crown.  
In 1926, Parliament raised a substantial loan under the Palestine and East Africa Loans 
Act which allowed the mandatory powers to consider significant infrastructure 
projects.102  With the cash in hand, the British Administration moved forward with a new 
project: the construction of a modern port. 
 The port of Haifa opened in 1933, after planning and construction starting in 1929 
and totaling £1,250,000 pounds sterling.103  The new port was everything that the British 
Authority could have wanted from a modern facility.  Previously, the harbor had been 
unable to accommodate sea-faring vessels, meaning that they had to dock a kilometer or 
more from shore.104  But the new port had a massive breakwater that created 300 acres of 
sheltered water, with 90 acres of dredged water, allowing large ships to dock within the 
breakwater.105 Investors, engineers and naval officers admired the new edifice, and the 
European shipping companies were duly impressed how easily the port accommodated 
large ocean liners.106  The October 1933 opening of the port was a triumphant affair, 
attended by numerous foreign dignitaries, including representatives from the French 
Mandate of Syria and Lebanon.  The speeches and the program of the ceremony crowed 
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over Haifa’s accomplishments.  The program for the ceremony emphasized the rapid 
population and economic expansion Haifa had undergone in the last decade, and stressed 
Haifa’s new place as a transportation center, with railway links to Trans-Jordan and Syria 
and “a network of good roads” that linked it with the interior of Palestine and Syria. 
 The opening of the port of Haifa also provided an opportunity to draw attention to 
the influence of European Jews on the economy.  The pro-Zionist newspaper The 
Palestinian Post connected Haifa’s new port with region-wide modernization.  This push 
towards industrialization and modernization came mostly from the Jewish immigration 
into Palestine, claimed the Post.  The author went further, saying “The Report issued by 
the French Government on Syria and Lebanon for 1932 states that it was primarily the 
building of a modern industry by the Jewish immigrants which led to a similar movement 
in Syria.”107  By emphasizing this conclusion, the Post places Jewish immigration as an 
important economic force region wide.  But more than this, the European Jews become 
the means to shock the Middle East towards modernity.   
In speeches, M. Nathanson, the president of the Jewish run company which 
constructed the port emphasized the support of Arab businessmen for Jewish 
immigration.108  He focused on the benefits of new business for the economy of Haifa as 
a whole, and presented the port as a joint Arab and Jewish endeavor. He told his crowds 
that while in 1932 the Municipality of Haifa granted 458 construction permits, due to the 
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immigration and economic boom, the number of permits rose to 1,210 in 1933.109 While 
Nathanson touted any economic growth as beneficial, the reality of Arab business 
attitudes towards the new émigrés was much more complex.  Although Haifa’s growth 
created a booming economy, it also raised the cost of living, pushing the less wealthy out 
of the city center.  Nathanson waved in numbers the air to support his points, but 
neglected to mention that construction business was generally dominated by new Jewish 
companies, staffed with highly paid Jewish experts and lower wage Arab laborers.  The 
new construction contracts cemented ties between Jewish business and the British 
government centralizing the business development, and pushing aside old lines of 
negotiation for the Arab businessmen.  Arab support for the port was tenuous; although it 
brought construction jobs, but also solidified Jewish control of the new infrastructure in 
the city.  Despite these complications, the British and Zionist interpretation of events was 
a progressive narrative: although the region had previously been mired in technological 
stagnation, the influx of European immigrants allowed the region as a whole to begin the 
march towards modernity, a march symbolized by the logo of the Levant fair: a flying 
camel.110 
 The success of Haifa’s new harbor was furthermore recast as an expected and 
prophesied moment in the Zionist march of progress.  An article in their “Haifa Habour 
Supplement” unearths a book written by Theodore Herzl, one of the founders of the 
Zionist movement.  In his novel “The Old New Land,” written in 1902, a young Viennese 
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Jewish lawyer visits Haifa Bay in 1923 after a ten-year absence, and is shocked by its 
revolutionary transformation.  “A magnificent city had been built beside the sapphire 
blue Mediterranean.  The magnificent stone dams showed the harbor for what it was: the 
safest and most convenient port in the eastern Mediterranean.”111  In Herzl’s imagining, 
he predicts the development of a port of Haifa created through Jewish entrepreneurship 
which would propel the city to modernization.  By excerpting Herzl’s book the Post is 
recasting the opening of the port as part of the fulfillment of the Zionist dream.  It is both 
a self-congratulatory message to the Jews of Haifa, and encouragement to continue 
building a homeland in Palestine. 
 Analogous to Beirut, the port in Haifa was constructed due to a local alliance 
between Jewish Haifan businessmen and the British mandatory government.  They 
combined British imperial financing with local industry to negotiate for a loan from the 
British central government and push forward infrastructure development in Haifa.  Due to 
previous infrastructure developments under the Ottomans, and improvements under the 
British, the new port could access the ‘hinterland’ of Syria and Hawran.  Haifa’s regional 
links into the trade systems of the Levant combined with its new ability to accommodate 
long-range trade in the Levant challenged the lines of trade which Beirut believed it had 
secured and which the French mandatory government profited from.  The consolidation 
of trade lines in Haifa was a shrewd move in terms of empire competition, inter-city 
competition and economic competition, and one which left Beirut floundering. 
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THE THREAT OF HAIFA (1929-1933) 
While Haifa built their port, Beirut suffered economically.  In the 1930s, both 
Palestine and Lebanon felt the effects of the Great Depression.  Palestine and especially 
Haifa felt the effect less keenly, seeing as the economic drop was somewhat ameliorated 
by the immigration of European Jews and the subsequent growth in the industrial sector.  
Lebanon, on the other hand felt the full force of the world-wide depression, as it hit a 
number of Lebanese economic sectors.   
A large part of the Lebanese economy depended on remittances from the 
Lebanese emigrants in North and South America.  Lebanese workers had been going to 
the Americas since the late Ottoman period, and sent a large portion of their wages back 
to their families in Lebanon, money that represented a substantial influx of capital into 
the local economy.  In 1920-26, the total average annual remittances were FF 30 million, 
an impressive sum which went directly to their families without taxes from the state.112  
During the depression, jobs in the Americas dried up, especially for working class 
immigrants.  As the Lebanese abroad struggled to make ends meet, the money they sent 
back home dwindled. 
Agriculture in greater Lebanon had steadily declined since the turn of the century, 
the traditional Lebanese silk industry dropped as synthetic Europeans fabrics gained 
popularity among consumers.  Western manufactured good threatened traditional 
industries such as silk and other textiles, and the farmers on Mount Lebanon were unable 
to restructure their production to survive in this new globalized economy.  The silk 
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industry had been decimated by World War I, and the French government had attempted 
to revive the failing industry after gaining Mandatory control of the territory.  This effort 
was somewhat successful; in 1910-11 Greater Syria exported 400 tons of silk, and with 
French help the silk production slowly recovered until it was at 387 tons in 1929.113  But 
with the worldwide recession, the demand for luxuries such as silk completely bottomed 
out.  In 1933, Greater Syria only exported 106 tons of silk, indicating a drastic reduction 
in production and demand.  Besides silk, which was one of the most lucrative exports 
from Lebanon, other agricultural sectors were also hard hit due to a drought in 1932 
which severely impacted olive production. Producers in the hinterland were looking at a 
potential country-wide agricultural crisis. 
 Trade to Syria and Lebanon in general was also severely affected by the 
depression.  Imports to Syria and Lebanon were at FF 726 million in 1929 and FF 339 
million in 1936, slashing trade into Beirut by almost fifty percent.  Export trade went 
from FF 255 million in 1929 to FF 156 million in 1934.  The losses in trade hit Beirut 
hard, as many of her fortunes still rested on income, taxes and tariffs from the port.  As 
the ships stopped coming, merchants lost their livelihood and companies had to shut their 
doors. 
The economic pressure resulted in increased migration from Mount Lebanon to 
Beirut, as farmers became workers in search of jobs.  As mentioned, Palestine had seen a 
similar pattern of migration, but the migrants to Haifa were able to find jobs in the 
industrial and construction sector. Lebanese moving into Beirut found no such growing 
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businesses, and in this case, and those coming from the countryside in search of better 
employment only added to the growing demographic pressure in Beirut.  While the 
French had worked to build up the city center, the working class could not afford the 
downtown rents, and so began cramming into unregulated housing on the periphery of 
Beirut.  As the working class grew, wages dropped, and the standard of living of the 
middle and working class fell just as Haifa was raising its standard of living with their 
large middle class influx.   
Tourism also took a dive, as middle and upper class travelers found that they 
could no longer spare disposable income for a trip to Beirut.  The tourists who had come 
through the port of Beirut to stay at the new European style hotels and to walk across the 
corniche could no longer be found on the streets of Beirut.  There was a slight rise in 
tourism from Palestine, because the successful European Jews who lived there could 
spare the money to travel north.  Yet this trickle of tourism could scarcely make up for 
the thousands of tourists from Europe and Egypt who could no longer make the longer 
trip by boat.114 
The results of these economic downturns may superficially look like just another 
instance of the worldwide depression.  Yet, the effects in Beirut added up to something 
altogether more problematic than simply an economic slump.  The port and the railroad 
were completed just at the turn of the century.  In the first operational years of both 
projects, they ran at a loss, and then the economic progress of the city was cut off by 
World War I.  In the 1920s, Beirut had just found its footing economically and benefitted 
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from steady operation in the port and the rail lines.  The city slowly lived up to its 
reputation as a modern center for culture and trade.  Suddenly, as the city started to define 
itself as a center of the Levant, the port lost a great deal of its trade due to the depression, 
the tourism which had imported French culture dropped off, and workers from the 
Mountain moved in, exacerbating class and secretartian tensions.  So when the Beirutis 
looked south and witnessed the rise of Haifa, this was not seen merely as a momentary 
setback, but a serious crisis.  In conjunction with the economic pressures, Haifa’s new 
port looked like it could permanently unseat Beirut as the main port of the Levant. 
Haifa’s success at building a new port underscored the inadequacies of Beirut, 
and threw the French authorities and the Beirutis into a panic.  As during previous 
transportation conflicts, the merchants and municipal council led the charge, and the 
press put the problem into the public conversation.  The threat to Beirut was conceived in 
dire terms. It was an economic menace that could unseat Beirut as the central port of the 
Levant, and this was the opening move to a monopoly of desert transportation that would 
allow the British to control the route to India and eventually China.115  To kick off the 
media frenzy that followed the opening of the port of Haifa, Le Commerce du Levant ran 
a four article series on “The Inauguration of the Port of Haifa and the War of Transdesert 
Transportation.”  In this series, the question of Haifa being a threat was rhetorical: “What 
is indeed the raison d'être of the port of Haifa, if not to replace the port of Beirut, to 
ensure that England has the control and command of the major routes in Asia and are the 
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heads of transcontinental lines?” asks the first article.116  Other newspapers echoed this, 
imagining that the rise of Haifa could be viewed as nothing else than a direct threat to the 
prosperity of Beirut.117  Only a month after the opening of the port of Haifa, Bassir 
claimed “Already, the flow of commerce seems to be turning away from Beirut in favor 
of the new port of Haifa.”118  Beirut’s newly gained position of supremacy could easily 
dissolve leaving her as a secondary port in the Levant.  To the Beiruti press and 
merchants this was unthinkable; if Beirut was not the finest, most advanced, most fabled 
city on the Mediterranean, she was nothing. 
 This situation was conceived of as a personal failing by the city.  Beirut has the 
better port, better routes and geographical situation, claimed Le Commerce du Levant.119  
The author of the series laments that with these advantages, all Beirut needed to do were 
to maintain the status quo, but instead had become complacent and the British surpassed 
them in only a few short years.120  “Beirut has lost enormously in importance, while 
Palestine worked energetically to improve the economic situation, in Syria and Lebanon 
we were occupied with issues of the presidency, the deputyship, ect.”121  These self-
admonitions point to the innate understanding of cultural and economic superiority the 
Beirutis had.  Beirut should be the primary port of the Levant because that is what she 
had created for herself with the port, the railways and the merchant’s ability to draw 
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foreign investment.  “In a few years,” Le Journalist Errant noted with disgust, “it is not 
impossible that the port of Beirut will resemble Tyre and Sidon.”122 There was also a 
deep cultural anxiety that Beirut was slipping from her place due to her lack of drive and 
ability.  
 The loss of the position of supremacy was not viewed as completely Beirut’s 
fault, however.  A number of the articles were infused with the feeling that this rise of 
Haifa was simply unfair within the context of its historic city competition.  It was not 
only that the natural balance of the ports cities has been upset, but it had occurred on a 
rigged playing field.  The newspapers claimed that the company given the port contract, 
the Nathaniel Company, was an unfair competitor.  Nathaniel Transport enjoyed financial 
backing by the British Mandate, due to the substantial loan from the Crown.  Therefore, 
Nathaniel did not have any significant financial risk.  Attempting to compete with these 
companies was unfair, the newspapers claimed, because private Lebanese companies 
cannot compete against the British state.  The new construction contracts which M. 
Nathanson claimed exemplified cross-confessional Haifan growth represented unfair 
business practices to the Lebanese, much like they did to the Palestinian Arabs who were 
being pushed out by the new Haifan industry. 
 While it may appear that the Beiruti press was simply finding any possible 
complaint to push for action on the port, this complaint of unfair competition had deeper 
roots.  By giving the contract to the Nathanial Company, the British mandate had 
engaged in a bit of smoke and mirrors themselves, similar to de Perthuis’ multiple fronts.  
                                                 
122 Le Journaliste Errant, 23 October 1933. 
 55 
When the British government in Palestine first announced the construction of the port of 
Haifa, they claimed that it would be constructed by the Service of Public Works of the 
British government, using the money from the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act.123  A 
number of nations, including German and Italy immediately protested that the project 
exceeded the powers of the British mandate.124  It should be remembered at this point that 
a mandate was technically not a colony.  The mandate was a specific legal term referring 
to territories controlled by European countries after World War I.  These territories had 
previously been controlled by the German Empire or the Ottoman Empire.  Following the 
Allied victory, these areas lost their sovereignty and control of their territory was 
transferred to the mandatory powers under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.  The mandate 
was therefore a technical legal term defining extent of the controlling power’s influence 
that could be adjudicated in an international court.   Officially, the mandates of Syria and 
Palestine were supposed to be a temporary situation until the territories were ready to 
become a country, introducing an independent nation where none had existed before.  In 
reality, the mandates were run more like colonies than fledgling nation states, and the 
mandatory powers attempted to extract revenue from their holdings.  By constructing the 
port of Haifa under a government department, instead of encouraging private local 
development, the British rather crassly exposed the reality of the economic extraction 
from the mandates.  Legally, the Mandate Charter had provisions for equal economic 
treatment for all nations, so instead of building the port themselves, the British should 
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have put up the project for public bidding.125  The Italian and German governments 
quickly called foul, attempting to block British economic development on the basis that 
they had exceeded their rights as a mandatory power.  In response to the international 
outcry, the British neatly sidestepped the issue, giving the contract to Nathaniel 
Transport, a company that had extremely close ties to the Zionist Organization and the 
Palestinian government.  This allowed the British government to avoid legal trouble, and 
Nathaniel Company to build the port with complete economic security. 
 While the Beruitis zeroed in on Nathaniel Transport as the target for their ire at 
this time, this complaint indicates larger sources of frustration and anxiety for the Beiruti 
merchants. The first source of frustration was that they perceived a general imbalance in 
the French and the British treatment of economics and commerce between the two 
mandates.  As previously mentioned, the British administration coordinated with the 
Zionist Organization throughout the 1920s to encourage industrial growth in Haifa.  In 
contrast, the French government did little to encourage significant economic growth, and 
usually left the development of public works to French run companies. This was both a 
continuation of the French mode of doing business in the Levant under Ottoman rule, and 
also an indication of the French Mandate’s preoccupation with security of the mandate 
over economic growth. The Beiruti merchants felt that they had been neglected, and that 
the tariffs on the port traffic caused an excessive burden on the commerce of the city.  
Haifa was a free port, and able to attract significant commerce because they could offer 
lower rates than Beirut.  Beirutis therefore blamed the French Mandatory powers for 
                                                 
125 Extrait du B.R. No. 6 de Jerusalem, 15 March 1929, Mandate Syrie-Liban, Box 708, MAE-Nantes.  
 57 
putting them in an inferior situation in relation to Haifa, while the British Mandate helped 
their competitors to the south.   
Newspapers raised alarmist concerns that Beirut would be cut out of future 
transportation project, because of neglect by the Mandate.  Al Bassir newspaper reported 
that the Air France intended to establish a central aerodrome in Damascus, cutting out 
Beirut on the route to Iraq and Persia.126  They furthermore claimed that the British 
government in Cairo was sponsoring a new airfield in Haifa, while the French 
government had allowed Tripoli instead of Beirut to secure a contract for a new 
airport.127  Lissan al-Hal took an even more alarmist view, hinting the war for desert 
transportation would soon be an armed conflict.  The British seemed to be developing 
joint transportation and military masses, claimed Lissan al-Hal, Aquba was now a land 
base, Amman an air base and Haifa a naval base.128  All of these reports had a thread of 
truth in them, but cast any development in a city outside of Beirut as a most dire threat.  
The editorialists believed that Beirut’s future economy could dissolve due to this 
momentary decline in fortunes.  This alarmism seemed to slip into full and unjustified 
panic in only a few months. 
 The outcry against the French administration was not a recent development, but 
had been building steadily during the recession.  During the 1920s, many Lebanese 
industries, such as the silk industry, experienced economic losses due to the importation 
of western manufactured goods.  The more expensive traditional industries could not 
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compete against the influx of cheap synthetic or industrially made products.  Lebanese 
blamed the losses on the French Mandate’s economic ‘open door’ policy.  The Lebanese 
believed that the French state was privileging the French industrialists who flooded the 
market with cheap goods instead of raising customs tariffs to protect Lebanese agriculture 
and business.129   
 Just as the Lebanese blamed the French lack of protectionism for the economic 
losses in agriculture, they also blamed French inaction for allowing the port of Haifa to 
gain ascendancy while Beirut was sleeping. If the loss of economic primacy was partially 
due to the fault of the French administration’s neglect, it was up to them to fix it.  The 
perceived solution to this massive attack on the center of Beirut economic platform was 
for the French Mandate to take action.  Many papers decried the High Commissioner’s 
inattention to the Haifan threat and apparent lack of response.130 “Why has France not 
decided to expand the port of Beirut?” demanded Lissan.131  Instead of dealing with the 
situation, Bassir claimed that “the French authorities in Syria get distracted by matters of 
little importance,” like raising tariffs.  The newspapers petitioned the High Commissioner 
in numerous editorials and articles to face the new pressure from the south.  “Will the 
High Commissioner continue to be indifferent to the efforts to wreck the commercial 
activity of this country?” asked Lissan in an editorial designed to spur the government to 
action.132 The most commonly repeated suggestion was to lower the tariff rate in the port 
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of Beirut.133  This obvious sore point remained an easy way to blame the French 
administration for the economic disadvantages of Beirut.   Another suggestion was for the 
government to promote transportation agencies to contract with Beirut to lessen the 
British ‘monopoly’ on desert transportation.134  Libano-Syrian companies needed the full 
support of the authorities to bring the rail and auto lines through Beirut instead of 
Haifa.135  The other significant suggestion to the High Commissioner was to widen and 
expand the port of Beirut.136  The papers worked to keep the conversation of the threat of 
Haifa in the public sphere, and also to publically pressure the High Commissioner into 
action. 
 In the press, we see the same sort of tactics of negotiation that the Beirutis had 
previously used during the Ottoman Empire.  In this age of flourishing local newspapers, 
it is not only the merchants but also the press attempting to petition the government to 
action.  They use the same tactics that had worked with the Sublime Porte.  The press 
requests immediate construction of a new port, just as the merchants had requested the 
port concession from the Sultan.  Additionally, the press frames this as a threat to the 
French mandate and the French economy, just as the merchants had attempted to frame 
the Haifan rail-line as encroaching on the Sultan’s land.  However, the press goes farther 
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than the merchants did before, framing the threat from Haifa as a military and existential 
threat in order to push the French government into action.  This indicates not simply a 
development in tactics of negotiation, but also just how tenuous these newly developed 
trade routes are perceived to be.  The Beiruti understanding of their city as a central node 
for trade and as a gateway between the east and west is now fully engrained in the public 




Chapter 3: Response of the French Mandate to Haifa (1926-1938) 
 While the papers may have believed that the High Commissioner was ignorant of 
the problems the port of Beirut, or at least portrayed him as such, they were mistaken.  
The mandatory government had their eye on the development of Haifa for some time, and 
elements of the administration had been concerned about the port of Beirut for years as 
well.  In the late 1920s and early 1930s, High Commissioner Henri Ponsot (1926-33) had 
made several attempts to address the economic crisis looming over Beirut.  Ponsot was 
not ignorant of the issues facing the economy of Lebanon, but he was a careful man who 
often plodded towards decisions, carefully weighing all the options before moving 
forward.  Moreover, the Lebanese economic situation at the port was not at the top of the 
list for the High Commissioner, as he was contending with the rising Syrian nationalism 
and with attempting to secure an oil pipeline from Iraq.  Ponsot arrived in Beirut in 
October 1926, as French troops mopped up the remaining pockets of resistance from the 
Syrian Great Revolt, which started in the summer of 1925 and was one of the most 
serious armed challenges to colonial power in the Middle East.  The reasons for the revolt 
go beyond the scope of this thesis, but a combination of local tensions and French 
mismanagement led to an outbreak of unrest by the Druze.137 The revolt swept out of 
Jebel Druze and through all of Syria, although there was never serious resistance in 
Lebanon.  One cause of the revolt was the heavy-handed administration of General 
Maurice Sarrail, the High Commissioner from 1924-25.  After the disaster of Sarrail’s 
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mismanagement of the Druze revolt, France reversed its policy of appointing military 
leaders as the High Commissioner, and instead turned to career diplomats, first Henri de 
Jouvenel (1925-26), and then Henri Ponsot.   
When Ponsot arrived in Beirut he searched for a middle course between security 
and force.  It was clear that the French political policy in Syria had been a disaster, but 
the number of different sects, the complicated political scene and the brewing nationalism 
in Syria made it extremely difficult to determine what the future policy should be.   
Under the charter of the mandate, France needed to put forth an organic law for Syria and 
Lebanon and move the mandate towards stable self-government, something which had 
been put on hold due to the revolt.  Ponsot toured Syria and Lebanon for four months, 
listening to various constituent groups who suggested various forms of government: a 
Constituent Assembly overseen by the French, a Franco-Syrian treaty, admission to the 
United Nations, and complete self-government.  Syrians and Lebanese waited with 
anticipation to hear Ponsot’s policy statement, hoping that it would signal a significant 
departure from the military rule.  In July 1927, Ponsot (through his intermediary Colonel 
Catroux) firmly stated that France would not relinquish the mandate, but would allow 
Syria to hold elections, elect a Constituent assembly and would continue to prepare Syria 
and Lebanon to become independent nations.138  He emphasized that violence would be 
dealt with harshly: the Mandate would protect their security and economic interests with 
force.  But the “liberalism of the French Republic cannot be questioned by anyone,” and 
the Mandate would continue to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and 
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Lebanon.139  This statement of policy was hugely disappointing to nationalists who 
believed Ponsot would relax France’s direct control of Syria’s politics.  Having been 
recently defeated by the French army, nationalists agreed to the necessity of collaboration 
with the French government, but did so with bad grace.140 
This cautious middle of the road negotiation characterized Ponsot’s entire 
commissionership.  Throughout his term, Syrian nationalists, now organized into the 
National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya) vied for more self-governance and transparent 
elections.141  Various political groups competed for power as they attempted to maneuver 
their parties into a seat of control in the Syrian government.  Ponsot’s response to this 
was to attempt to maintain the status quo, to avoid any sudden policy changes, and 
prevent any sort of agitation or unrest.  Above all, he feared another outbreak of 
hostilities just after the military repressed the Great Revolt.  With Syrian political 
concerns and the internal security situation at the forefront of his mind, Ponsot let the 
Beiruti economic situation slide to the back burner.  Lebanon had its own host of 
problems, but nothing that was a volatile as the Syrian nationalists, who appeared to grow 
in power and organization every day. 
Without attention by Ponsot, the worsening global economic situation hit sectors 
of the Beirut economy as local politicians tried to get the High Commissioner’s attention.  
In 1929 members of the Lebanese political and merchant community attempted to prod 
the High Commissioner into dealing with the economic problems facing Lebanon.  Early 
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proposals by Emile Eddé and Habib Trad focused on slimming down the expensive 
Lebanese bureaucracy.  Eddé and Trad were two members of the political and 
commercial establishment in Lebanon.  Eddé was a Maronite lawyer from Beirut, his 
father and grandfather had been dragomen to French merchants in Damascus, and had 
climbed the typical social ladder for Christians who worked with European merchants.  
Emile Eddé (b. 1888) himself was member of the new Lebanese political establishment, 
was President of the Republic of Lebanon (1936-41).  Habib Trad (b. 1885) was a Greek 
Orthodox banker and landowner; he was never elected to office but wielded political 
power through his commercial interests and his alliance with Eddé.142  Both had the ear 
of the commissioner and attempted to push him towards action. 
Habib Trad sent the High Commissioners a multifaceted proposal for 
restructuring Lebanon’s economy which focused on cutting down the number of elected 
officials and the number of state employees in order to reduce the amount of state budget 
going towards wages, reallocating this money to public works projects.  Furthermore, the 
government’s deputies and some advisors would be chosen from the business sector and 
advise on restructuring the state’s fiscal policy.143  This sort of proposal which privileged 
the merchants of Beirut was obviously self-serving for a man such as Habib Trad, but 
also identified the administrative inattention towards the economy.  Commissioner 
Ponsot approved Trad’s proposal, indicating the centrality and importance of both the 
need for drastic political change and the importance of the business sector in Beirut.  Yet, 
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after approving the plan, Ponsot found himself unwilling to make any substantive 
governmental changes in Beirut and actually implement the plan, causing Habib Trad to 
resign from the parliament in protest.144  This episode highlights several salient points 
about the operations of Beirut under Ponsot’s commissionership.  First, the merchants 
were intimately involved with the mechanics of the government, and usually businessmen 
served in parliament and ran for office while they continued to manage their holdings in 
Beirut.  Second, both the merchants and the French government were well aware that a 
serious economic crisis was brewing, a crisis that the current structure of the Lebanese 
government was ill-equipped to handle.  Thirdly, Ponsot was willing to listen to the 
suggestions of Lebanese officials on how to address the economic and governmental 
problems that Lebanon faced.  Despite this, Ponsot remained unwilling to significantly 
change the political structure in Lebanon, finding himself both reluctant to move and 
concerned that there would be a significant outcry from other interests in the Lebanese 
government. 
 Without restructuring the Lebanese government in a way that would allow it to 
confront the brewing economic crisis on its own terms, Ponsot needed to take action as 
the economic effects of the depression hit Lebanon in 1930.  At the start of this year, 
Ponsot developed an ambitious program of public works developments which would 
restructure and strengthen the transportation network in Lebanon.  The proposal from the 
High Commissioner’s office and Eddé’s government included a number of high cost 
projects: enlarging the port of Beirut, constructing a rail line between Beirut and Tripoli, 
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developing a seaplane port in Tripoli, and improving the telephone network in 
Lebanon.145  This ambitious program was exactly what Lebanon needed to secure its 
place as the central port of the Levant.  This would modernize the facilities in Beirut 
while bringing it into closer contract with the developing city of Tripoli.  Unfortunately 
for Beirut, when Ponsot saw the recession hit the budget over the course of 1930 and 
trade dramatically decrease in Beirut, he scrapped the majority of the plan, including 
jettisoning the idea of enlarging the port.   
 The only economic situation that Ponsot successfully dealt with in regards to 
Lebanon was the threat of Haifa securing sole rights to an oil pipeline from Iraq.  The 
French mandatory government had been concerned about the economic threat of Haifa 
even prior to Haifa’s construction of a new port because of the Anglo-French conflict 
over the construction of oil pipeline from Iraq.  The history of the oil concession in Iraq is 
one which has already been told, and like the revolt it goes outside the confines of this 
work.146  Suffice it to say that during and after World War I, the European powers were 
extremely interested in accessing the oil they believed to be under the surface of the 
fields of Mosul and Kirkuk.  Even before the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which 
held exclusive exploration rights, discovered the largest reserves of oil in the Kirkuk oil 
field, Britain and France engaged in a diplomatic battle over the oil.147  In the late 1920s, 
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the plan was to discover the main oil fields in Iraq, and then build a pipeline to the 
Mediterranean, where the oil could be refined and put on tankers which could carry the 
oil to Europe and the Americas.  The immediate question that the French and the British 
asked was: which city would the pipeline go to? 
 The French had a 23.75% share in the TPC, and wanted the pipeline to go through 
Syria and Lebanon.148  Even before the company struck oil, Lebanese newspapers like 
Mokattam began grumbling.  “The oil is in a country under British mandate, and Britain 
is understandable eager to have the upper hand on [oil] transport.”149  The Lebanese press 
believed there was no chance that Iraq would favor a Lebanese port like Alexandretta 
over a British city, declaring, “It is almost certain that [Iraq] opts for Haifa… it will 
create a pipeline directly linking Baghdad and Haifa.”150  Only five months after 
Mokattam ran this article, on 14 October 1927, drillers struck a massive reservoir of oil at 
Baba Gurgur on Kirkuk Field, unleashing a geyser of oil so powerful that killed two 
workers and spewed ninety thousand barrels of oil over the next day.151  The hypothetical 
question of where the pipeline would go suddenly became a reality, as the Turkish 
Petroleum Company needed an outlet to transport this mass of oil to the coast. 
 The French officials and Ponsot’s office strongly pushed their case for a pipeline 
to a Lebanese port.  In negotiations with the TPC, they pointed out that the routes to the 
three possible ports (Beirut, Alexandretta and Tripoli) were shorter and less expensive, 
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and would pass through terrain which was less problematic to lay track than the route to 
Haifa.  However, the British argued that their route was more secure, a route which 
would pass southwest through Iraq and Transjordan to Amman where it turn to go 
directly northwest to Haifa.  Both the English and the French feared that they would 
become completely economically dependent on the other the country if they did not 
control the oil from Iraq.   
In 1929 and 1930, both the French and the British attempted to court the 
(renamed) Iraq Petroleum Company and the government of Iraq to their route.  The 
French High Commissioner declared in February 1929 that if Iraq chose the northern 
route, the Mandatory government would build a concurrent railroad from Syria to 
Lebanon.152  This route would be funded by a bond from Syria and Lebanon, which 
would be financially guaranteed by the French government.153  Historian James Barr 
reports this information from British archival sources in A Line in the Sand, however, it is 
unclear if the French High Commissioner Ponsot ever followed up on these promises.  He 
certainly had every intention of building the railroad to convince IPC, and the option 
remained on the table for a number of years.  But, it also seems likely that these promises 
to the IPC were a part of the package of infrastructure developments that Ponsot planned 
before the Lebanese economy crashed in late 1929.  This is supported by the fact that the 
High Commissioner’s Office also promised the Iraq Petroleum Company that France 
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would build a first rate port in Tripoli if the northern route was chosen.154  It seems 
extremely doubtful that Ponsot would have ever followed through on the promise to build 
a port in Tripoli, considering that he could not even pay for an extension of the port of 
Beirut. 
While these promises seem empty with the benefit of hindsight, at the time they 
galvanized the British to make the southern route more attractive to the Iraq Petroleum 
Company.  In 1930, they came to a compromise with both the French and the IPC, and 
convinced the IPC to create a bifurcated pipeline that reached two terminus points at 
Haifa and Tripoli.  Like any good compromise from Ponsot’s administration, this left no 
one happy.  Both the French and the British had averted the disaster of losing out on the 
Iraqi oil, but they did not gain any significant advantage in the war of trans-desert 
transportation.  Furthermore, Haifa had indeed gained an oil pipeline, setting it up to be a 
center of commerce as Sir Herbert had planned in 1925.  
So when Haifa completed its modern port in 1933, France was aware of the need 
to restructure Beirut’s economy to compete with Haifa, but had been unable to do so.  
Officials looked to the south with trepidation over what effect the Haifan port would 
have.  From the beginning of the Haifan project, French authorities believed that the 
British port project had a strong military component.  They worried that the port was the 
beginning of a naval base on the Mediterranean that would be able to dock a British naval 
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fleet.155  Lieutenant de Feriet conducted the first military report on the Port of Haifa in 
November of 1927.  Lieutenant de Feriet’s official recommendation to the High 
Commissioner of Syria and Lebanon immediately recognized the potential economic 
threat of Haifa as well.  “If we believe that the expansion of the Port of Haifa can lead to 
unfortunate results for the port of Beirut, we have time to take measures to help us to also 
prepare a program.”156  This early report already attempts to incite action by the French 
mandate, indicating that with this advanced intelligence, Beirut could develop a program 
to retain military and economic superiority before Haifa established itself as the main 
port of the Levant.  During the construction of the port, the regular reports on the port’s 
progress from the French consul in Haifa did not satisfy French mandatory officials.  The 
French began spying on the port construction to discover the exact stage of development 
and who the primary contracted companies were (for the main port, the electric 
installation, the Shell pipeline and more).  They reported with worry that John 
Chancellor, the High Commissioner of Palestine (1928-31), claimed that after 
construction Haifa would rival Marseille.  In 1931 the secret reports, complete with 
drawn maps of the construction and photos of Haifa’s coastline, admitted that there was 
not yet any sign of barracks or hangers or any presence of a naval base.  Despite the lack 
of any evidence of a military operation, the intelligence officer maintained, “Their plan 
was established by the Admiralty.”157 
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 All of this subterfuge by the French military and intelligence services indicates an 
extreme military anxiety towards Great Britain.  The interwar years were characterized 
by increasingly cool relations between the British and the French.  French fears of 
Britain’s military foothold in the Middle East blinded them to the most important threat 
faced by the French mandate, the economic threat.  The panicked military analysis was 
offset by the more coolheaded advice of the French Consul at Haifa.  Pierre Maurice 
Grapin had been the Foreign Office’s representative at Haifa since 1928, and had 
monitored the situation of the port since almost the beginning of his term there.158  Grapin 
immediately notified Beirut when the Port of Haifa entered an active construction phase, 
transmitting the know specifications of the port regularly.159  Considering Grapin’s 
regular and accurate communication to Beirut, it is unclear why the Mandatory official 
felt the need for a military assessment and covert investigations, seeing as the information 
they collected was not significantly more than what Grapin had sent already.  Mostly 
likely, this simply indicates the extent to which the French believed the true purpose of 
the operation was a naval base, and they had expected their intelligence operatives to 
uncover this concealed plan. 
  Just as the Beruiti press felt that the European Jews had tilted the playing field, 
the French officials felt that the Jews acted as an unfair advantage in the war for 
transdesert transportation.  French officials added another level to this interpretation of 
events, that of a racialized understanding of the Jewish immigrants.  Jacques d'Aumale, 
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the Consul General of France in Jerusalem had a view of the Jewish immigrants as 
extremely wealthy, with movable capital.  The German Jews who came to Palestine came 
with “all their capital, all their fortune,” and were able to invest their vast sums into the 
Palestinian economy.  Now, “the country runs on gold,” M. d’Aumale claimed.160  As 
mentioned, the German Jews who were able to make the journey were usually financially 
stable, and had attempted to liquefy their assets before being forced from their homes, 
which allowed them to invest in the industrial sector.  However, d’Aumale uses a 
negative racial stereotype of moneylending Jews to remove fault from the French 
government’s economic misfortunes and ascribe the success to the racial composition of 
Haifa as opposed to Beirut. 
To complicate this image, Consul d’Aumale went on to describe German Jews as 
“intellectuals and industrious workers with energetic personalities.”161  Here we see the 
multifaceted stereotype of the German Jew.  Although Consul d'Aumale evokes the 
stereotype of greed, he also has the stereotype of Jews as urban intellectuals, and as 
industrious German workers, superior to the Polish Jews who arrived in the 1920s.  This 
image of hard working Europeans directly contrasts with the French’s stereotype of the 
lazy Arabs.  Consul d’Aumale sets up this contrast which intimates that the British 
Palestinian government has benefitted from the influx of a better stock of people than the 
ones the French mandate has to put up with.  In this racialized interpretation, the rise of 
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Haifa is not the French government’s fault because the success of the more Europeanized 
city was a racial inevitability. 
Consul Grapin called the situation in Haifa “artificial and transitory,” and did not 
believe that the current level of Jewish investment had the potential for longevity.162  
Writing in 1935, d’Aumale agreed with this assessment.  “We should not attribute the 
prosperity of Palestine to a carefully prepared British economic plan,” claimed d’Aumale.  
He effectively strips away fault or responsibility on the side of the French authorities by 
placing the full reason for Palestine’s prosperity at the hands of international events.  In 
1929, he claimed, Palestine was in the same economic depression as the rest of the world, 
and the Jewish Agency had “nothing but debts.”163  “But Hitler came. So, in two years, 
prosperity covered Palestine.  The German Jews, intellectuals and industrialist, in general 
possessing hard working and energetic personalities, arrived by boatloads, with capital 
and goods,” he states.164  This rather neatly encapsulates the French reasoning for the 
entire prosperity of Palestine.  It was international events which they could not influence 
or change which caused the development of the port of Haifa.  This neatly ignores the 
fact that the British government intelligently allied with Jewish industrial investors to 
create conditions conducive to economic growth.  Furthermore, it ignores the British 
government’s deliberate focus on the economic development of Haifa, privileging it for a 
port over other options such as Jaffa.   Instead, when Consul d’Aumale wrote his report in 
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1935 he blamed Haifa’s increased prosperity on the boom in German Jewish immigration 
from 1933-34.  The French officials in Beirut were well aware of the waves of Polish 
Jewish immigration in the early 1920s, the German immigration from 1929-31, and the 
slowly growing industrial sector in Haifa.  Furthermore, they were aware of the plans to 
enlarge the port of Haifa from almost the minute the plan was floated, due to Consul 
Grapin’s attention to events, and the not-so-subtle announcements in The Palestinian 
Post.  The French officials had clearly known about the potential impact on Beirut and 
neglected to develop a counter strategy. 
 Instead of a counter strategy, when the port first opened the French tactic was to 
deflect public opinion.  Two days after the opening of the port of Haifa, an internal memo 
admitted that “One can expect that during the period following the inauguration of the 
port of Haifa, the tone of the press will become quite bitter.”165  But instead of addressing 
the actual issues, the memo continues, “In order to divert public attention, it may be 
desirable that a diversion should be found, for example the publication of the transit 
agreement with Persia - if it is already concluded - or any other fact of this kind.”166  The 
underlying message of the internal memorandum is that the problem does not need to be 
fixed, but the Beiruti merchants needed to be distracted and appeased, so that they would 
stop agitating for change in the press. 
 Consul General d’Aumale’s long term assessment of the Beirut – Haifa port 
development reflects this attitude.  D’Aumale reproduced the Palestinian press’ numbers 
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of tonnage passing through the ports: in 1929, Beirut had 1,991,000 tons and Haifa had 
1,267,000 tons.  In 1933, Beirut had 2,320,000 tons and Haifa had 2,682,000 tons, 
indicating economic growth across the board in the Levant, and also that Haifa had seen 
exponential growth and surpassed Beirut as the largest port in the Levant.167  D’Aumale 
emphasized in his report that the trade in Beirut did not decrease.  He goes on to say that 
the “the traffic passing through Haifa could not go through Beirut.”168  The goods going 
through the port of Haifa were oranges (from the November to March growing season in 
Palestine), heavy goods such as coal, wood cement and iron diverted from Jaffa, and 
goods the German Jewish immigrants brought over with them.169 Consul d’Aumale’s 
analysis of the numbers is partially accurate, but neatly obscures any sense of 
responsibility that the French might have about their lack of action concerning the port of 
Beirut. 
 The French mandate, especially Consul General d’Aumale, described the rise of 
Haifa as if it was surprising, yet a historical inevitability.  The port was receiving more 
traffic because the goods were diverted from Jaffa, not because there was less traffic 
going through Beirut.  The rise of the port of Haifa was due to the international situation 
and the superior work ethic of the Jewish immigrants as opposed to the Beiruti Arabs.  
The British economic consolidation in Haifa could not have been predicted.  Instead of 
viewing the anger in the press as justified worry about the economic threat to Beirut, it 
                                                 
167 M. d’Aumale, Consul de France a Jerusalem à Le Haut Commissaire, report #84/10/E, 20 February 
1935, Mandate Syrie-Liban, Box 708, MAE-Nantes. 
168 Ibid, 20 February 1935. 
169 Ibid, 20 February 1935. 
 76 
was Arab nationalist agitation being fed by the powerful merchants in the city.170  French 
officials believed that the large scale merchants were attempting to maintain the tone of 
distress in the press, and “nationalist agitators” were exploiting this moment as one that 
would bring Arab unity.171 
 But the Arab press and Arab merchants were not casting this as a nationalist fight.   
They did not call the Beiruti to arms, or attempt to turn this into a region-wide issue as 
the French had feared.  Instead the press laid out clear economic and diplomatic solutions 
that the French government could take to ameliorate the situation.  Le Commerce du 
Levant’s suggestions at the end of their four part series on Haifa were that Beirut should: 
a) develop a Freeport to offset the issues of tariffs, b) improve the state of the Damascus-
Baghdad rail line to draw more business, and c) promote local transport companies so 
that private enterprise could challenge British transportation.172  This does not indicate 
the development of nationalist language, but instead an economic call to arms.  The 
Beiruti merchants wanted to work together with the French mandatory government to 
improve the position of the city.  It was the intractability of the French government to do 
anything which was raising the level of agitation in the press, and causing them to cast 
this battle as a dire fight which would cause the end of Beirut. 
 Despite all this tension, High Commissioner Ponsot seemed obstinate.  He did not 
make a move to act on any of the suggestions in the papers.  It was only until French and 
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Arab business interests bonded together that and a new commissioner took over that the 
Beirutis successfully petitioned the government to action.  As noted, their campaign 
started almost immediately once the port of Haifa opened in late October 1933.  Habib 
Trad arrived home from France and immediately took stock of the panicked tone of the 
press.  Instead of attempting to calm investment fears, he urged the press to continue their 
agitation and influenced the Journalist Errant especially to continue sounding the alarm.  
Trad himself began talking of the threat to Beirut as one of survival, and as a fight 
between the two cities.  Concurrently, he immediately called for all businessmen to join 
tighter, across both confessional and ethnic lines to pressure the High Commissioner to 
take immediate action on this issue.173  Instead of addressing these concerns, the 
commissioners’ office recommended that the High Commissioner should find some 
means of “appeasement” that would give “a few large traders (Habib Trad…)” 
confidence, and ameliorate their concerns on current economic problems.  This sort of 
discussion at the upper echelons of the French mandatory government again highlights 
the official’s intractability and unwillingness to take any serious action which would 
mean risk for the French government. 
 In 1934, the parameters of the situation had changed.  The salient reason for this 
was that Damien de Martel became the new High Commissioner.  If the French 
administration under Ponsot generally treated political concerns as the primary issue in 
governance and economic concerns as a distraction from political, military and strategic 
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issues, High Commissioner de Martel turned this policy around.174  De Martel 
disembarked onto the port of Beirut on 12 October 1933, and immediately made his way 
to Damascus to deal with the continuing problem of the Syrian nationalism.  Like Ponsot, 
de Martel was a career diplomat who had previously served in the Far East.175  But unlike 
Ponsot, de Martel was well known as a man of action.  The Quai d’Orsay kept very close 
relations with de Martel, and trusted him to take pragmatic and swift decisions to deal 
with the Syrian nationalists, in contrast to Ponsot, with whom they had lost faith.176  They 
wanted de Martel to reevaluate the French policy on Syrian unity and take action. 
Martel arrived just as the Syrian parliament was gearing up for elections, and his 
main focus in the first few months was to get through parliamentary elections without any 
violence, and without any significant gains by the Syrian nationalist parties that would 
disrupt Mandatory control of Greater Syria.  The elections in Syria would not directly 
affect Lebanon, but Syrian unionists wanted Lebanese support for a unified Syria and 
Lebanon.  In 1932, the Syrian nationalist party attempted to use the threat of Beirut’s 
precarious economic situation to push Lebanese Christians into supporting them, telling 
Beirutis that the French government was unable to economically protect them.  The 
Syrian nationalists claimed that if Syria and Lebanon split into two separate countries, 
Syria would direct its trade through the port of Haifa instead of Beirut.177  This was a 
fairly thin threat considering that the rail line to Beirut was at that time a faster route than 
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the line to Haifa.  But the Syrians exacerbated Lebanese fears of economic recession and 
preyed on Lebanese fears that Ponsot would fail to react to the economic depression in 
Beirut.  They hoped that they could pull the Lebanese Christians to supporting Syrian 
unionism, instead of the Lebanese exclusivism which they usually supported. 
While Ponsot had seen Beirut’s economic problems as an albatross, de Martel saw 
an opportunity.  As soon as he arrived, newspapers exhorted him to give his attention to 
the port, saying, “We demand, now that [the new High Comissioner] has personally seen 
the terrible state of our commerce, to remedy this pitiful situation.”178  De Martel realized 
that he could use the economic situation of Beirut as leverage against the Syrian 
nationalists.  By focusing on the needs of the minority groups of Lebanon, de Martel 
could counter the Syrian nationalist’s attempt to co-opt groups like the Lebanese 
Christians.  To this end, in his first year and a half as High Commissioner, de Martel 
threw himself into the economic problems of Syria and Lebanon, and used his successes 
there as both an incentive for Lebanese groups to ally themselves with the French 
government, and as a smokescreen for the continuing political problems in Syria.  “All 
political activity today… must be carried out discreetly if we wish to avoid reactivating 
the opposition, which is at present crumbling.  Therefore I am trying to concentrate the 
public’s attention on economic projects.”179  De Martel’s tactics were simple yet 
effective.  The Syrian nationalists protested vociferously that de Martel was concentrating 
on economic improvement to distract the public from the fact that he was making no 
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progress on moving Mandate Syria towards self-government.180  But, the method was 
successful in encouraging economic growth in Lebanon and Syria, de Martel effectively 
refuted the nationalist’s claims that the French were unable to help Lebanese Christians 
and took away their method of wooing the Christians to their side.  He also positioned 
France to create closer ties with the Lebanese merchants, who hoped that under the new 
administration the High Commissioner would support Beirut’s economic crisis instead of 
focusing all his attention on the problems of Syrian nationalism.  This was de Martel’s 
first card in carefully separating public opinion in Lebanon from the Syrian unionist 
cause; presenting France as the savior of Lebanon while the Syrians were only looking 
out for their personal gain.181 
 Therefore, when ‘Umar Da’uq galvanized the chamber of commerce, and 
petitioned the High Commissioner for immediate action, the petitions of the Lebanese 
finally did not fall on deaf ears.  Da’uq (b. 1865) was a Sunni Muslim and powerful gold, 
clock and jewelry merchant, who held influential connections with the Muslims of Beirut, 
including the Bayhoum family.182  Da’uq was something of an elder statesman of Beirut, 
because of his long tenure and influence as a member and later president of the Chamber 
of Commerce.  ‘Umar Da’uq concisely states: 
Beirut is threatened by the large modern port of Haifa… The Lebanese economy 
is on the decline, the re-exportation trade is inhibited by newly imposed customs 
duties, agricultural output is falling, and the transit trade is seriously jeopardized.  
Such palliatives as the construction of additional warehouses and the signing of 
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commercial agreements are without effect.  Iraq and Persia are both looking for an 
outlet on the Mediterranean, and transdesertic traffic is increasing.183   
 
‘Umar Da’uq, Habib Trad and other prominent merchants successfully galvanized the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Lebanese parliament to petition the new High 
Commissioner for an immediate response to the threat of Haifa.  De Martel wanted to ally 
with the Lebanese Chamber of Commerce and to sway public opinion, and so de Martel 
ignored the advice of the High Commissioner’s office which urged him to create a 
distraction, such as the commercial agreements which Da’uq dismissed as meaningless 
palliatives.  Instead, de Martel quickly decided to both establish a free zone in the port, 
and to allocate a significant amount of money towards the creation of an extension of the 
port of Beirut.  Unlike Ponsot, de Martel was quick and decisive, and also had the support 
of the Quai d’Orsay to engage in such an expensive project, even as the economy of 
Beirut stumbled.  He therefore secured a loan of 40 million francs from the French 
government to be spent on the port of Beirut expansion. 
The response to de Martel’s announcement of a port extension was 
overwhelmingly positive.184  Both traders and working class Lebanese rejoiced at the 
news of the port extension, believing that this would significantly impact the business of 
Beirut.  De Martel made an excellent first impression on the people of Beirut, and they 
took this as a sign that the High Commissioner intended to pay attention to the economic 
problems of Beirut rather than the political problems of the Lebanese and Syrian 
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Parliaments.185  The press reported with glee that “the High Commissioner has lately 
declared that he would delay the political problems and would deal with economic 
affairs.”186  The Lebanese understood that their fortunes had turned around. 
The press feted the High Commissioner, announcing that the entire country 
received the news of the High Commissioner’s reorientation to economic affairs with 
great satisfaction.  This was an “essential way to remedy the crisis and restore prosperity 
to our country.”187  They praised the High Commissioner’s character, saying that, “One 
of the qualities predominates the High Commissioner is the spirit of decision. As soon as 
he takes a decision, he is quick to execute.”188  The High Commissioner, the editorialists 
declared “has realized the urgency of the situation, and he has responded.”189 
Some members of the press still had doubts, and were not sure that this was the 
solution to their economic issues.  Editorialists noted that the Chamber of Commerce had 
been waiting for economic improvements for some time, and although the High 
Commissioner had delivered, but in the past the French government had made promises 
and had not followed through.190  In 1929, the Lebanese government promised 40 million 
francs for irrigation projects to revitalize the failing agriculture in the mountains.  This 
money fell through and was squandered into bureaucratic expenditures.191  Previously, 
the government would “dangle millions” in front of the Lebanese people “as if it were a 
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morphine injection could calm the nerves.”192  But now the Lebanese knew that these 
millions often did not reach their destination, or came with so many restrictions that they 
were not helpful to the Lebanese economy.  Although the press greeted the news of the 
opening of the port with a clamor of approbation, they all agreed that besides expanding 
the port, the High Commissioner needed to repeal the taxes and customs on the port, 
which would continue to make Beirut a less attractive shipping option than Haifa.  And if 
Beirut was to be the primary entrepôt to Iraq and Persia, the French Mandate needed to 
finalize definitive trade agreements so that the merchandise coming into Beirut would 
have somewhere to go.  Otherwise, Beirut would be “a port without boats.”193 
Despite misgivings, the credit for expanding the port was given to the High 
Commissioner for acting quickly in the crisis, the chamber of commerce for pushing the 
plan and the press for keeping the issue alive in the editorials.  Their petitioning of the 
French government had been successful in presenting the port as a commercial solution 
that would allow the French mandatory government to retain its grip on trade in Syria.  
The press saw that the lines of trade passing through Beirut would be protected, as there 
would be no reason for Mediterranean trade to move south if Beirut possessed the most 
modern trade infrastructure.  All of the press and coverage of the announcement of the 
expansion of the port of Beirut saw this as a direct response to the challenge from Haifa.  
Not a single Lebanese paper considered that Martel could have the secondary motive of 
silencing the press on political issues and distancing the Beiruti merchants from the 
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Lebanese nationalists, which was likely part, although not all, of his reasoning for 
constructing a new port in Beirut.  Instead, they saw this as the Lebanese merchants and 
press successfully working with the French government to present a mutually beneficial 
solution to an economic problem.  
Although the press feared that the funds for the port of Beirut would mysteriously 
be lost in the pockets of officials, work did go forward on the extension of the port and 
completed in only four years.  The massive new port had a breakwater of 490 meter, and 
800 meters of deep-water docs, meaning that the port could dock even the largest ocean 
liners.194  The port opened in a massive celebration on 13 June 1938, meant to signal 
Beirut’s triumph over the threat of Haifa.195 At the opening ceremonies, High 
Commissioner de Martel declared the new edifice the “largest commercial port in the 
Levant,” clearly referencing Haifa.  He went on to say “the port of Beirut is admirably 
placed to serve the commercial exchanges between the Middle East, the Mediterranean 
and the West - exchanges to become increasingly important as the Levant becomes… 
more prosperous.”196  This reinforced Beirut’s perceived center as note only an important 
transit route, but also an exceptional point where the best of the East and the West 
combined to create the unique city of Beirut.  Finally, de Martel declared the fifty year 
existence of the modern port “a model of true Franco-Lebanese collaboration.”197   
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Chapter 4: Competition in Air Transport (1926-39) 
 In the 1920s, the port saw another vehicle arriving occurring in its waters, that of 
the hydroplane.  Air transport developed as a commercial enterprise in the Middle East in 
the late 1920s, when France, along with Great Britain, realized the strategic and practical 
interest in connecting their colonies by air.  The introduction of commercial aviation 
became a site of Anglo-French competition between Haifa and Beirut, just as the railway, 
the oil pipeline and the port.  Both cities had hydroplanes landing in the port, and the 
French believed that the British intended to develop Haifa as their main air hub.  To 
counter this, the French government would need to build an aerodrome in Beirut to 
compete.  More generally, Beirut wanted to secure the construction of an air terminal in 
their city which would concretely fix Beirut as an aviation hub.  The construction of this 
infrastructure would make Beirut the best possible stop for planes entering the Levant, 
just as a hundred years earlier the lazaretto made Beirut a must-stop for European ships.  
The new air competition gave the government and the populace another reason to be 
concerned about Beirut’s economic security even as the port construction began. 
The inter-war years are now colloquially known as the “Golden Age of Aviation,” 
a period in which technological advances in aircrafts made long range flight possible and 
commercial flight economically viable.  A certain element of romance surrounded the 
great aviators of the time; Charles Lindbergh flew across the Atlantic in June 1927, and 
Amelia Earhart repeated this feat in 1932.  While record setting flights ignited the 
public’s appetite for air travel, other first flights also tested the possibilities for regular 
commercial air travel.  In the 1920s and 1930s, the Middle East had its own share of 
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celebrity pilots who were often attached to a nascent air carrier.  In the early days of this 
aviation, the coastal cities played an essential role, because without air terminals or 
runways, most test flights were on sea-planes or “flying boats.”  The first sea-plane test 
flight to Beirut was conducted by Maurice Nogues in 1926, and paved the way for the 
formation of an early airline, Air Union – Lignes d’Orient198 in 1927.  The company 
inaugurated a regular air-mail service between Beirut and Marseille on 6 June 1929, 
conducted twice a week with four intermediate stops199 and a flight time of 30 hours.200  
Air Union – Lignes d’Orient’s successor, Air Orient, expanded this into a seven-day 
route to Saigon.  With the port and the railway already located in Beirut, it appeared that 
the coastal city would be an obvious node for air transport.  The air-mail and short hop 
lines carried out by seaplane were initially a success, but Beirut’s bay was open to 
unpredictable weather patterns which made landings tricky.  Many of the water-landings 
were transferred to Tripoli in 1935 after a fatal crash in the port, forcing the French 
government to reevaluate their plans for Beirut as an air center. 
Some of the safety problems of the hydroplane landings in the port of Beirut 
would be solved by the planned port expansion, which would extend the breakwater and 
limit the effects of the choppy seas.  However, the construction on the port also meant 
that the Air-France hangers would not be able to operate during construction.201  Air 
France enjoyed special privileges due to the French Mandate’s open skies policy towards 
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their national company, and they requested permission from the government to move 
their facilities to Tripoli for the time being.202  In keeping with the good relations Air-
France had with the High Commissioner, this transfer was fairly easily accomplished.  
Air France leased their hanger in the port of Beirut to the Mandatory authority, free of 
charge, and the Mandatory authority paid the cost of the company’s transfer up to 
Tripoli.203  The administration was amenable to fronting the 220,000 franc cost of 
moving the company, as it would be compensated through use of the hanger and the 
continued easy relations with the national airline.  However, this interaction highlighted 
two significant problems with the hydroplane operations in Beirut.  The use of seaplanes 
centralized transportation systems in Beirut, but it did not allow for significant expansion, 
seeing as the planes had to negotiate space with the port authority.  The seaplanes could 
not land outside of the protected breakwater, and while the expansion of the port would 
help enlarge the limited space, Air France still had to negotiate with the port authority to 
land their sea planes.  Additionally, although Air France could expand their services and 
company, the age of massive concessionary companies, like the ones run by Edmund de 
Perithius, was over.  Air France did not have the capital to build an air-terminal on their 
own (although it was much less expensive than a port), and as seen in their 
correspondence with the Mandatory government, required government support simply to 
move their operations to Tripoli. 
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 The question of how to develop and regulate air infrastructure was being asked all 
over the world during the 1920s and 1930s.  As use of the airplane became regularized 
not only for the military purposes and transporting international post, but also for 
passengers, it became clear that the possibilities of commercial aviation were growing 
quickly and would require infrastructure to support it.  However, it was also clear that 
“aviation companies cannot pay themselves for the establishment of their 
infrastructure.”204  Countries had to decide how they would handle this particular 
infrastructure development; if building terminals would be a public or private operation.  
For example, Germany left the creation and management of airports to limited liability 
companies, and the states or cities provided land and subsidies which enabled the 
construction of these terminals.205  France initially placed the development of the 
aeronautic infrastructure in the hands of the state, and regulated all terminal and aircraft 
construction through the central government.  Yet this proved to be “too rigidly 
bureaucratic, and the narrow framework of administrative formalism” did not allow the 
sort of swift business development that a rapidly growing industry needed.206  In 
response, the central government loosened its hold on the industry slightly, and allowed 
the companies to privately develop.  The state retained control on the centralized 
meteorological radio safety system, and also reserved the management of airfields to 
municipal chambers of commerce and port authorities (for hydroplane operations).207 
                                                 





This type of control was intended to respond to the dual pressures of needing to expand 
private air enterprises, and design a unified system of air bases (usually referred to as 
“service bases”) that would unify French holdings.208  For countries with geographical 
disparate empires, the importance of developing effective air links was paramount.  The 
easy air hops through the empire connected the administration from Paris to Indochina, in 
France’s case, or from London to India, in England’s case.  This allowed for the swift 
transfer of information, post, and administrative personnel that were required to keep the 
far-flung reaches of empire connected.   
 In the case of France, the short lived Air Orient (1930-33) ran a successful route 
from Marseille to Saigon which took a little over a week.  The seaplane line started in 
Marseille and arrived in Beirut two days later (with stops in Naples, Corfu, Athens and 
Castelrosso).  Passengers disembarked from the seaplane and were taken by automobile 
to Damascus, where they spent the night and left the next day on the on a route which 
arrived in Saigon five days later (with land stops at Bushehr (Persia), Jask (Persia), 
Karachi (British India), Jodhpour (India), Allahabad (India), Calcutta (India), Yangon 
(Burma), Bangkok (Thailand)).  This arduous route was nonetheless the fastest way to 
transport passengers from the metropol to the farthest reaches of the empire.209 
 The mixed private and governmental control of the airline economy resulted in an 
interesting twist on the Anglo-French empire competition.  The mandatory governments 
were, as ever, engaged in economic competition between their states and this naturally 
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extended to the realm of air travel.  Furthermore, air control was a military concern much 
the same as naval control.  For this reason, the French government watched the 
development of air traffic in Palestine with avid interest.  The national airlines were also 
in competition with each other; France’s Air France, Britain’s Imperial Airways, 
Poland’s LOT, and others all competed for the most air routes and the highest volume of 
passengers and cargo.  However, these airlines which were each sponsored by their home 
county’s government also often joined together in business deals and partnered on long 
routes.  Because in the mandatory territories the air terminals were usually built by the 
governments, the business that a single company could bring in would not persuade a 
government to invest in an airstrip.  But if a number of companies agreed together to 
operate out of a city, the government could be convinced to move forward with an 
expensive infrastructure project.  For example, in 1932 a legation from the Netherlands 
approached the French high commissioner to discuss an agreement between Britain, 
France and the Netherlands to improve air infrastructure between the Levant, Iraq and 
Persia.210  Such deals were often advocated for by the countries national companies and 
then pushed forward by administrative officials. 
 While collaboration between the airlines was necessary and useful, both the 
French and the Lebanese were also interested in controlling a larger part of the aviation 
market in their national companies.  To this end, a number of Lebanese-based 
concessionary companies invested in the creation of a Franco-Lebanese national air 
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transport company that would be held as a subsidiary to Air France.  Together, these 
companies raised a million francs in order to develop this national airline.  Air France 
itself invested a quarter of a million francs, and four companies invested 100,000 francs: 
La Banque de Syrie et du Grand-Liban; la Compagnie du Port, des Quais et Entrepôts de 
Beyrouth; la Compagnie du Chemin de fer D.H.P.; la Régie Générale de Chemins de Fer 
et Travaux Publics.211  Other smaller investors picked up the rest of the bill, and through 
the collaboration of these different companies allowed for the creation of the Franco-
Lebanese national airline called Compagnie Générale de Transport (CGT), later to be 
named Air Liban, a company which later merged into Middle Eastern Airlines (MEA). 
 When de Martel took over as High Commissioner, his changed economic policy 
opened the door for various infrastructure projects, and there was suddenly the possibility 
of developing a new air field.  De Martel saw the need to develop air infrastructure, and 
realized that he could pay for an air terminal under the shadow of the immense 
construction already occurring at the port.212  The development of the terminal had a 
preliminary budget of 5 million France, as compared to the port’s massive expense of FF 
49 million.213  Furthermore, de Martel had the French Army’s commanders pressuring 
him to develop new airfields along the coast of the Levant that could function in a 
military capacity.  By 1934, de Martel was able to assure the commander of the army that 
he had already ordered the department of Public Works to undertake several studies of a 
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permanent airfield in Beirut, and he assuaged the immediate need for a military field by 
allowing the creation of an emergency airfield between Sidon and Tyre.214 
 Although de Martel was willing to explore other options, it is clear that he was 
determined to base his new airfield in Beirut.  After having agreed to the creation of a 
new port in Beirut, he saw no reason to disperse the military and economic centers in 
Lebanon, much to the chagrin of cities like Tripoli.  The High Commissioner’s office 
now advocated Beirut as a center for commerce.  The Levant, the High Commissioner’s 
office claimed, was a “geographical center at the intersection of routes linking Europe 
with the East and the Far East” and furthermore “an important stopover for international 
aviation relations.”215  The High Commissioner agreed with the army that the current 
facilities in the Levant were inadequate to the French republic’s growing need for 
aeronautical infrastructure.  There were two air strips in the interior of Greater Syria, but 
facilities on the coast remained inadequate.  Damascus was the main stopover on routes 
to the East, and it had an airfield of 1100 by 1500 meters and two asphalt runways with 
electric lighting.  This was the field most frequently used by Air France, followed by 
Aleppo, which held only one runway of 780 meters.  On the coast, there were only two 
sea-ports besides Beirut.  Tripoli-El Mina had one sea-port with a water runway of 1000 
meters, which was the terminus of sea-planes on any France to Indochina route.  The 
village of Kleist also had a small landing area of 600 meters and acted as a feeder link for 
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seaplane flights.216  Clearly, there was no permanent airfield on the coast, and even 
Damascus’ facilities equipped with electricity were becoming inadequate.  The minor 
sea-ports simply did not have enough infrastructure links to the interior to make them 
effective aviation centers, and facilities in Beirut were inadequate.  
 Relying on only hydraviation meant that the Air France was confined to using 
small sea-planes on their routes through Beirut.  The first routes from Marseille to Beirut 
were usually flown by the Chantiers Aéro-Maritimes de la Seine (CAMS) seaplanes, 
which were tiny biplanes that flew about 85 miles per hour, and could carry three or four 
passengers crammed in with some small cargo.  Directly before the opening of the new 
Bir Hassan airport, Air France had begun using slightly larger seaplanes, which could 
carry six passengers and their baggage.  Despite the interest and investment in this part of 
Air France’s routes, the line was still a tiny operation.  For example, in 1938 before the 
aerodrome opened, Air France ran a Tel Aviv-Haifa-Beirut route in cooperation with 
Palestinian Airways (a subsidiary of Imperial Airways).  When Air France first 
inaugurated the line in September 1938, it was tri-weekly, and by November 1938 the 
line became a daily route, and by December a twice-daily route.217  Air France was 
obviously able to easily fill the seats on their two planes with six seats (one pilot and five 
passengers), as the numbers they released for the routes reflect the rapid growth of their 
business:  
November 1938 - 278 passengers (134 departed Beirut, 144 arrived) 
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December 1938 – 426 passengers (218 departed Beirut, 208 arrived) 
January 1938 – 477 passengers (277 departed Beirut, 250 arrived)218 
Clearly, the company was selling seats, but operations were small, and even the process 
of buying a new aircraft or finding a pilot who was qualified to fly the planes was a long 
and difficult process.  Opening the new aerodrome would not solve all these issues, but 
ending Beirut’s reliance on sea-planes would open possibilities for larger aircrafts that 
could hold more passengers.  Air France looked forward to the possibilities of opening 
new, longer routes that the new aerodrome afforded. 
French mandatory authorities began construction of an airport in 1936, even as 
the port was underway, and quickly completed the small terminal and airstrips by 1939, a 
much easier and cheap endeavor than the massive port expansion.219  Choosing a spot for 
the airport was difficult, as Beirut’s terrain did not easily lend itself to the construction of 
runways.  After several rejected proposals, the High Commissioner made the decision to 
build the airport in the southern dunes of Bir Hassan.  Recent port construction provided 
another solution; in order to get sand for the port, construction companies had removed 
the sand dunes at Bir Hassan and used it as filler in the port.  The new airport had three 
runways, each over 800 meters, laid out on a bizarre axis that engineers had determined 
would minimize interference from the winds which swept over the dunes.  The new 
terminal sat at the cross of the axis, a squat white building designed to look sleekly 
modern.  Inside, the terminal and the runways were electrified, and housed offices for 
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customs, post, and health inspections.  Although there was a restaurant in the terminal, 
unlike other airports, there was no sleeping space for passengers because the city and her 
hotels were accessible in only ten minutes by automobile.220  This aerodrome easily 
outstripped the other facilities in the Levant, making it the most frequented airport.   
 
 
Figure 6: Photo of the construction of the runways, showing the three runway axes221 
 The opening to Beirut’s Bir Hassan aerodrome was conducted in a similar fashion 
as that of the port opening.  Although this was not as large project as the port, the 6 June 
1939 inauguration was a homage to the power of the mandate, her commitment to the 
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technological innovations of modernity, and to the international cooperation that air 
travel required.  Although the ceremony fêted French accomplishments, they were also 
aware of the necessity of international links between the air companies that would 
allowed trans-national hops.222 Therefore, although the aerodrome was funded by the 
French government, and the band at the inauguration played the Marsellaise at least three 
times, in the next day’s L’Orient, the aerodrome was touted as “a creation of friendship” 
between nations.223  A mass of delegates from different European and Middle Eastern 
countries were invited to the three hour ceremony including Sir William Mitchell, an Air 
Marshal from the Royal Air Force, representatives from both the military and civil air 
force in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Palestine and Turkey, and representatives from Poland, 
German and Italy.  Additionally, members of the Beirut elite attended, including Habib 
Trad who secured for himself the position of the President of the Aero-Club of Syria and 
Lebanon.224  The new airport drew in traffic quickly, becoming a stop for Air France, 
Misr Air, Palestine Airways, Lot’s Warsaw-Tehran route, and Deutshe Luft Hansa’ 
Berlin-Tehran route.  For a brief period, before tensions in Europe destabilized the airline 
routes, Bir Hassan was seeing over 30 daily landings and takeoffs, much more than 
anticipated.   
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Unlike the French, the British did not concentrate transportation activities in any 
one city in the Levant.  In the early 1930s, the French mandatory authorities watched 
Haifa’s airplane traffic with interest.  Haifa’s port was initially was a landing for sea 
planes, and for some time it looked like Haifa would be where Britain concentrated its 
economic and transportation interests.  On 10 September 1930 Imperial Airways 
inaugurated service between Egypt and Palestine, using Haifa as the seaplane landing.225  
The seaplane service between Alexandria and Haifa took only 2.5 hours, and could carry 
fifteen people.  To the French administration, it appeared that Haifa would be developed 
for future air travel on the coast of the Levant.  By inaugurating this new air service to 
Egypt, “the British Administration registered once again their desire to develop the 
northern port of Palestine at the expense of Jaffa,” M. d’Aumale reported.226  However, 
the British mandatory government of Palestine ultimately decided not to build the airport 
in Haifa.  It is unclear if this decision was due to the problematic terrain of Haifa (that 
Beirut dealt with by expensively leveling the area), or if local actors from Jaffa and 
Jerusalem were able to sway the government.  Either way, in 1936 the British 
government constructed Wilhelma Airport (later to become Ben Gurion Airport), with 
four runways near Ludd (Lydda), which lies inland between Jaffa and Jerusalem.  By 
constructing the main Palestinian airport in Ludd instead of Haifa, Haifa was not able to 
continue to compete with Beirut in the 1930s and into the 1940s.  
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 The air routes and the construction of terminals had also become a site of 
competition; each mandate proving that they could successfully connect their colonies to 
the seat of the Empire.  However, in this instance, the French government needed no 
impetus from the press or the merchants to concentrate infrastructure and lines of trade in 
Beirut.  Through the work and alliance between the merchants, the French commercial 
interests and the state, these lines were already set.   Beirut had secured its place through 
the development of the modern port, and the French government identified Beirut as the 
obvious choice to concentrate aviation developments.  The French mandatory powers had 
secured their ascendance over the British commercial center of Haifa by centralizing 
transportation in Beirut which became a shipping and aviation double threat.  This 
allowed Bert to maintain its centrality in the lines of trade which had developed across 




It is often tempting to read history as an assured linear development, to read the 
struggle between the state and the city as oppressively unequal, or to read colonial control 
as a dominating and exploitive relationship.  However, none of these stereotypes hold up 
to the evidence explaining the rise of Beirut.  Instead, Beirut is a story of the power of 
capital and trade.  Local merchants, European investors and the state worked to position 
Beirut on the lines of trade which would make it a lucrative and indispensable node of 
trade and transport in the Middle East, and a gateway to the Levant. 
The concrete measure of Beirut’s integration into the trade systems of the Levant 
can be gauged through their long-term infrastructure development.  The first important 
improvement was in 1934, when Ibrahim Pasha built the lazaretto that fixed Beirut as a 
necessary entry-point to the Levant.  Shipping routes from Marseille and Istanbul which 
had previously stopped at a number of ports along the Levantine coast now concentrated 
in Beirut to wait for quarantine.  Following this, French investors negotiated with the 
Ottoman state and allied with local merchants to centralize overland trade in the city, first 
through the roadway and then with the rail lines.  Count Edmund de Perthuis’ 
concessionary companies could be read as an extractive European industry, but the 
merchants view the development of these elements of transportation infrastructure as a 
victory.  The new transportation links allowed Beriut to more easily access the hinterland 
of Greater Syria, and also solidified important trading ties between the European 
investors and the local merchants.  Beirutis knew that these alliances and lines of trade 
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would eventually make Beirut’s fortune, and worked to concentrate investment and 
development in their city. 
The city was given an opportunity to gain trade centrality in the region through 
the construction of a port in 1898, which put Beirut on a par with other modern ports.  
During the thirty year battle for the port, members of the merchant classes consistantly 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the importance of infrastructure improvements to 
make their city competitive in region-wide trade.  Beirut repeatedly initiated a 
transportation project in response to improvements in competing cities, attempting to 
create and then maintain Beirut’s economic superiority in the region.  Merchants 
demonstrated an ability to organize to petition and negotiate with the Sultan and to 
advocate their agenda in the corridors of Istanbul.  When the state failed to respond to the 
city’s need for development, the merchants restructured their tactics and used political 
and trade contacts to ally with French investors who could push projects forward without 
significant state support.   
These strategies remained present in the period of the French mandate, when the 
merchants used tactics developed in the Ottoman period of petition, negotiation, and 
collaboration with the French-run companies in order to protect Beirut’s growing transit 
economy. Although Beirut had ably positioned itself as the gateway to the Levant from 
1900-1930, this position was still tenuous, and the trade lines were fragile.  When their 
city’s regional centrality was threatened in the 1930, due to the rise of Haifa, the 
merchants knew that the rise of a southern rival with a more modern port and the same 
regional trade links to the hinterland could quickly reorient the trade routes of the Levant, 
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cutting Beirut out.  The merchants and the populace of Beirut again worked together to 
petition the French mandatory government to reorient their economic policy towards 
building up Beirut.  Furthermore, the response of the French to Haifa reveals a military 
and economic anxiety that Great Britain would be able to control the Middle East through 
commercial and transportation superiority in both the port and the oil pipeline to Iraq.  
Through the press and petitions from the Beiruti merchants and politicians, the local elite 
was able to convince the French Mandatory government that expanding the port was the 
best route to restoring the economic and strategic superiority of the Mandate of Lebanon 
and Syria.  The ability of the merchants and the press to pressure the Lebanese 
government into funding the project of the port demonstrates their ability to promote 
local capitalist interests within the colonial state.  Beirut as a whole mobilized to fight the 
threat of city competition from the south, and was ultimately successful in gaining rail, 
port and airway improvements of which secured the centrality of Beirut in the Levant. 
This push for a modern port solidified Beirut’s centrality in both in the region, 
and in French Lebanon.  In the contest for the air terminal, Beirut barely has to pressure 
the mandatory government to construct the air terminal in Beirut as opposed to another 
city.  The concentration of infrastructure in Beirut made her the obvious choice to center 
the growing aviation industry, so that line of air travel could be added to her collection of 
trade routes.  The construction of the 1939 air terminal signaled the definitive victory of 
Beirut over Haifa and the solidification of her centrality as a regional capital. 
The century long struggle for Beirut’s centrality reveals the development of 
merchants’ and Beiruti’s understanding of their city as a gateway to the Levant, and their 
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progressive tactics to secure the infrastructure developments which would make it that 
gateway.  It furthermore reveals the importance of the alliance between local 
businessmen and foreign capital in developing the trade networks of the Levant, and the 
ability of this alliance to pressure the state.  After years of subverting the state and 
demanding that the state assist in the development of the city, Beirut finally gain the 
French mandatory government’s full support for her economic development in the 1930s.  
This alliance of state, local and financial support finally gave Beirut the tools needed to 
secure her place as the central gateway to the Levant. 
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